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I. INTRODUCTION
Summary judgment has long been the bane in the Seventh
Amendment’s existence. From nearly the moment Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 562 was passed, controversy ensued over whether it intruded on the
jury's role to determine issues of fact.3 This controversy continued at more or
less the same pitch for about fifty years. That summary judgment plausibly
threatened the jury right was a legitimate concern. But this concern was
tempered by the motion’s limited use and the United States Supreme Court’s
own pronouncements cautioning that the motion should be granted with
restraint.4
Things changed with the Summary Judgment Trilogy5 of 1986, which
was widely perceived to strengthen summary judgment.6 A torrent of
scholarship alleged that this invigorated version of summary judgment
empowered judges to decide cases at the expense of the jury trial.7 The
Summary Judgment Trilogy was also perceived to strengthen judgment as a
matter of law,8 the less drastic of the motions.9 Criticism of summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law culminated in the mid-2000s with
scholarship that attacked the constitutional support for the motions
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The current version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. A party may move for
summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which
summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
3
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1019–21 (2003) (discussing Judge Jerome N. Frank's view in the 1940s, soon after
Rule 56 was passed, that it threatened to undermine the jury's role as fact-finder).
4
See, e.g., id. at 1021–25 (discussing the limited role summary judgment was expected to play even
by advocates of Rule 56 and the Court’s modest conception of the motion).
5
The “Summary Judgment Trilogy” refers to the Court’s decisions in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
6
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 1062–63 (discussing how the Summary Judgment Trilogy
represented a major break with the Court’s more restrained conception of summary judgment).
7
See infra Part III.A.
8
See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 157 (1988)
(arguing that the Summary Judgment Trilogy implicitly changed directed verdict doctrine to “permit judges
more fact-weighing freedom than they formerly held.”). “In federal practice, the term judgment as a matter
of law” refers to both directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 919 (9th ed. 2009).
9
See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing how summary judgment is more restrictive of the jury right than
judgment as a matter of law).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/4

2016]

A DIFFERENT TACK

335

themselves.10 These critiques received much attention, even in the national
press.11 But criticism of the motions’ common law pedigree did not change
them. It did not prompt the Court to reconsider its conclusions about whether
the motions are constitutional or whether its reasoning was proper. Nor did
it result in reforms to scale back the motions as presently constituted or to
limit their use.12 The motions continue as ubiquitous features of our litigation
system.
That means the impact the motions have on the intended goals of the
Seventh Amendment continues unabated. The Framers believed a civil jury
deciding issues of fact instills in the litigation system the standards of
common people.13 It was designed to act as a check on the power of Article
III judges, instill confidence that litigation would redress grievances, and
ultimately, foster democratic participation.14
Overall, the Seventh Amendment is the only amendment from the
Bill of Rights that could be said to attempt to directly address the enduring
divide between the elite, both economic and political, and the masses.
Summary judgment undermines these goals by ending litigation before the
jury trial. Judgment as a matter of law does this as well, by either directing
what the verdict should be or overturning the jury’s verdict. Both motions
also disproportionately benefit economic elites who use them against average
plaintiffs with fewer resources or connections.
During the time the Court strengthened summary judgment and
undermined the Seventh Amendment, the Seventh Amendment’s
counterparts in the Bill of Rights experienced a quite different treatment from
the Court: the Court gradually deemed almost every other right from the first
eight amendments of the Bill of Rights fundamental to our system of ordered
liberty.15 As a result, through the process of selective incorporation, these
10
See Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 573, 575 (2003) (discussing the dubious support for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in the common law); see Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA.
L. REV. 139, 158–60 (2007) (arguing summary judgment does not have support from common law
procedures). But see Edward Brunet, Procedural Justice: Perspectives on Summary Judgment, Preemptory
Challenges, and the Exclusionary Rule: Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625,
1630–48 (2008) (arguing that common law-analogues support the constitutionality of summary judgment).
11
For instance, the New York Times covered Suja Thomas’s Why Summary Judgment is
Unconstitutional. Adam Liptak, Cases Keep Flowing In, but the Jury Pool is Idle, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/30/us/30bar.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&; see also Thomas,
supra note 10, at 158–60.
12
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). Although the Court has recently proven its concern
with blatant fact-finding masquerading as deciding a question of law. See id. at 1868 (vacating and
remanding the Fifth Circuit for improperly weighing facts in affirming the district court’s grant of summary
judgment); see also infra notes 135–54 and accompanying text (discussing how the Fifth Circuit intruded
on the jury’s fact-finding role).
13
See infra Part II.A (discussing the values protected by the Seventh Amendment).
14
See infra Part II.A.
15
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763 n.12 (2010) (observing that nearly every right
from the first eight amendments of the Bill has been deemed fundamental and fully incorporated against
the states).
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rights from the Bill of Rights were held to apply against the states.16 Of
course, the Seventh Amendment remains on the outside looking in.17 But the
growth in the number of fundamental rights from the Bill of Rights also
presents an opportunity. The chance that the Seventh Amendment will remain
non-fundamental decreased with each additional right brought into the fold.
Recent scholarship has argued that the civil jury right is fundamental,18 and
one court followed that lead, receiving national media attention.19
Finding that the Seventh Amendment is fundamental could lead to
greater protection for the Seventh Amendment. The Court’s approach to the
Seventh Amendment is its most formalist approach to any right from the Bill
of Rights. Unlike other rights from the Bill of Rights, the Court has never
used a strict scrutiny balancing test for the Seventh Amendment. But a core
belief of constitutional law is that restrictions of fundamental rights trigger
strict scrutiny.20 By now it is well known that this belief is more myth:
fundamental rights are usually governed by categorical rules or less protective
standards of scrutiny or balancing tests.21 It is also true that balancing of any
kind, even strict scrutiny, is currently not in vogue with the Court.22 But even
if strict scrutiny’s application to fundamental rights is a myth, it is a myth that
in some cases still happens to be true.23
Strict scrutiny still applies to some fundamental rights where a
restriction directly impacts the core values the right was intended to protect.24
So what would inspire the Court to abandon over two centuries’ worth of
16
See infra Part V.A (discussing how through the process of selective incorporation fundamental
rights are applied against the states).
17
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13 (noting that the Seventh Amendment remains one of the nonfundamental, fully unincorporated rights from the Bill).
18
Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After McDonald v. Chicago, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 159, 191–94 (2012) (applying the McDonald Court’s factors to find the Seventh
Amendment is fundamental from an American perspective and incorporated against the states).
19
See Gonzalez-Oyarzun v. Caribbean City Builders, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 265, 272–77 (D.P.R. 2014)
(holding that the Seventh Amendment is fundamental and applies to the states); Eugene Volokh, Does the
Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Right Apply to the States (and to Puerto Rico)?, WASH. POST (Aug.
12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/12/does-the-seventhamendment-civil-jury-trial-right-apply-to-the-states-and-to-puerto-rico/.
20
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (strict scrutiny
applies to restrictions of fundamental rights); Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental
Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 227 (2006) (discussing the “well-worn adage” that fundamental rights
trigger strict scrutiny).
21
See Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 872 (1994) (fundamental rights rarely trigger strict
scrutiny to begin with; the Court usually applies an undue burden standard); Winkler, supra note 20, at
227–28 (noting the limited deployments of strict scrutiny to assess restrictions of fundamental rights).
22
See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment can Teach
Us about the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 865 n.55 (2013) (discussing recent criticism of the traditional
tiers of scrutiny by Justices Roberts and Scalia).
23
This phrase is borrowed from C.S. Lewis after a meeting with J.R.R. Tolkien that helped convert
Lewis to Christianity: “Now the story of Christ is simply a true myth: a myth working on us in the same
way as the others, but with this tremendous difference that it really happened[] . . . .” 1 THE COLLECTED
LETTERS OF C.S. LEWIS 977 (HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. ed., 2004).
24
See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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formalism in favor of strict scrutiny for the Seventh Amendment? The answer
is certainly not just the erosive impact of summary judgment on the civil jury
trial. As will become clear in this Article, critiques of summary judgment
have continued for decades without any changes by the Court to its formalist
reasoning. So the most likely predicate for strict scrutiny is first, finding that
the right is fundamental, and second, that the restrictions of the right directly
impact its core values.
Summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law do just that when
they usurp the jury’s fact-finding role. Moreover, judicial procedures are
supposed to satisfy the substance of the common law in order to be
constitutional: that is, juries are supposed to decide questions of fact and
judges are supposed to decide questions of law.25 But the summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law sanctioned by the Court’s formalist reasoning
do not satisfy the substance of the common law. To the contrary, both
motions accord the judge much more power to remove cases from the jury
than at common law.26 Strict scrutiny, as applied here, will limit that power.
As a result, it will satisfy the substance of common law better than the
procedures sanctioned by formalism.27
Part II briefly explains what interests the Seventh Amendment was
intended to protect and why these are important to our democratic republic.
It also shows how the Court has historically assessed whether the jury right
has been violated compared with how it assesses other rights. Part III
provides an overview of summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law,
explains how they have undermined the jury right and when they are most
intrusive on the jury right. Part IV argues for a mixed category-plus-scrutiny
approach to assess the constitutionality of these procedures. Part V offers
justifications for requiring the least restrictive alternative means in the
summary judgment and judgment as matter of law context. Finally, Part VI
concludes by addressing potential arguments against the use of strict scrutiny
and balancing in general to assess restrictions of the Seventh Amendment.
Summary judgment and, to a lesser extent, judgment as a matter of
law, have eroded the civil jury trial. The Court’s formalism is to blame for
these motions. At the same time, the Court has steadily designated most of
the other rights from the Bill of Rights fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty. The Seventh Amendment is too, a fundamental right. As a
fundamental right, strict scrutiny should apply, to defend it against direct
restrictions such as summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.

25
26
27
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II. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT’S IMPORTANCE
The first Section of this Part briefly describes what the Seventh
Amendment protects and why it is important. Section B then describes the
Court’s approach to assess restrictions of the Seventh Amendment. Section
C concludes with how this differs from the Court’s approach to other rights
from the Bill of Rights.
A. The Values It Protects
The civil jury right was revered by the founding generation. For both
politicians and common people, the right was crucial to the development of
the United States.28 As Justice Story said, the Seventh Amendment was “a
most important and valuable amendment[] . . . .”29 The civil jury right traces
back centuries in one form or another to England.30 Blackstone, in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, called it “the most transcendent
privilege which any subject can enjoy[;]”31 and recognized it as a “principal
bulwark” of liberty.32
The Framers believed a civil jury trial was necessary for several
reasons. Perhaps most importantly, they viewed it as a check on the
corrupting power of judges. A jury composed of twelve men assembled for
just one case would be less susceptible to corruption or the influence of the
sovereign, than a single, unelected Article III judge.33 With a jury trial,
private litigants would also know that their interests could be vindicated in
litigation with the government.34
Moreover, with a jury composed of lay people determining questions
of fact, the standards of the common people could be instilled in the litigation
system.35 Indeed, jury decisions were sought because it was believed they
would affect a different result from judges.36 The Supreme Court has echoed
these sentiments, noting how valuable it is to have disputes of fact decided by
the community at large.37 Finally, a jury would also promote democratic

28
See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639, 656 (1973) (noting that both politicians and the public from the founding generation were “strongly
attached” to the trial by jury in civil cases).
29
2 J. STORY & MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 544 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. ed., 5th ed. 1994).
30
Wolfram, supra note 28, at 653.
31
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 379 (Dawsons of Pall Mall
ed., 1966).
32
Id. at 350 (noting with approval the multiple references to trial by jury in the Magna Carta).
33
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Kathleen M. Sullivan ed., 2009).
34
Wolfram, supra note 28, at 671–72.
35
Stempel, supra note 8, at 166.
36
Wolfram, supra note 28, at 653.
37
See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) (“It is assumed that twelve men know more of
the common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted
facts thus occurring than can a single judge.”).
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values of participation and citizen access to the litigation system.38
There is plenty of debate over whether the jury actually does advance
these values. Scholars marshal evidence that both supports and undermines
the jury’s ability to assess the evidence and arrive at rational decisions.39 And
whether jury participation actually instills confidence in the judicial system is
unclear too.40 But studies that may undermine what the Framers believed to
be true about the civil jury are not reasons to undermine it. We owe our
loyalty to the system we inherited, regardless of the empirical data.
B. The Court’s Seventh Amendment Reasoning
The Framers codified their views on the importance of a civil jury
right through the Seventh Amendment. It requires two things of the federal
courts. First, the right to a jury trial must be “preserved.”41 Second, no court
can reexamine a fact tried by a jury other than by the rules of common law.42
The Court’s approach to the Seventh Amendment has traditionally been the
most formalist of its approaches to rights from the Bill of Rights. When courts
use “formalist” reasoning to adjudicate a case, it is based on the belief that a
legal system contains a few general principles that can settle legal questions
through the rigid application of rules.43 When formalist reasoning has been
replaced by other adjudicative approaches, it is because it fails to ascertain
the real-world impact or interests of the parties at stake.44 Formalist reasoning
acts on both parts of the Seventh Amendment: what claims the right covers,
that is, what is “preserved,” and, the kinds of judicial procedures it allows,
which is usually thought of in terms of what can be “reexamined.” But
procedural devices are also thought of in terms of whether the jury right is
“preserved” since devices like a six-person jury,45 or whether to require
unanimous verdicts46 could deviate from what the civil jury was like at
common law. Ultimately, for both parts, the Court’s Seventh Amendment
formalism is reflected in analogical reasoning.47
38

Stempel, supra note 8, at 166.
See Miller, supra note 22, at 873 n.99 (citing studies that argue both sides).
40
See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 161, 186–90 (marshaling data to critique the view that the jury acts as a check on judicial power
and aids democratic participation).
41
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
42
Id.
43
See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 497 (1988) (defining
formalism as the belief that a legal system contains only a few “general principles composed of rigidly
defined concepts to generate specific legal conclusions by a logical, objective, and scientific process of
deduction.”).
44
See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
949–57 (1987) (discussing reasons why formalism is supplanted by balancing tests).
45
See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160–61 (1973) (using six person civil juries is permissible).
46
See American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897) (requiring unanimous jury verdicts).
47
See Miller, supra note 22, at 896 (observing that the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence
relies “primarily on analogical reasoning from history and common law in order to determine its
applicability and scope.”).
39
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Through the “historical test,” a claim recognized in an English
common law court in 1791 (when the amendment was ratified) or its analog
at United States common law, requires a jury trial for a plaintiff today.48 The
Court’s approach here proceeds in two parts: first, the Court ascertains
whether the type of action at issue is analogous to actions brought in 1791
English courts of law or courts of equity.49 The second part, which is most
important according to the Court assesses whether the remedy sought is legal
or equitable.50
To determine whether judicial procedures like summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law are constitutional, the Court determines if the
procedure satisfies the “substance” of English common law in 1791 as well.51
By “substance” the Court does not mean that new procedures must mimic
every little detail and form of the common law.52 Rather, the Court has
defined “substance” to mean that questions of law should be resolved by the
court and questions of fact should be determined by the jury.53 But, in reality,
the Court just compares the new procedure to see if it is similar to the
procedures used at common law.54
This analogical approach is formalist reasoning in its purest form: the
Court confines its assessment of a new procedure to simply compare and
contrast it with common law procedures. There is no consideration of the
impact the Court’s decision will have on litigants, the courts, or government
in general. The Court has at least considered functional factors when
determining whether the jury right applies in the first place, like whether the
jury is capable of handling a particular question and the impact on courts.55
But for judicial procedures, the Court has only mechanically assessed whether
the procedure is sufficiently similar to common law procedures.
While the Court’s touchstone for new judicial procedures may seem
inadequate, we have a good idea of the power judges had at common law to
prevent unnecessary trials. For one thing, common law pleading was so
stringent that it kept many worthy plaintiffs from getting to trial.56 The judge
48

E.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
E.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
50
Id.; Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (citing
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989)).
51
E.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
52
Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931).
53
Redman, 295 U.S. at 657 (citing Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897)).
54
Thomas, supra note 10, at 147.
55
See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (suggesting that the Court considers “the
practical abilities and limitations of juries.”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 390–91
(1996) (deciding the first clause of the jury right by considering the importance of uniformity in the
treatment of a given patent rather than just whether the litigant has a right to a jury at common law); see
also infra Part VI.C (discussing the Court’s limited forays into balancing).
56
See, e.g., Stephen Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 917 (1987) (discussing how the rigidity of
common law pleading rules led to parties loosing on technicalities).
49
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had the power to screen cases through trial procedures too.57 Chief among
these was the demurrer to the evidence.58 Through this procedure, at the end
of a trial, a defendant could obtain a decision on the law of the case by
admitting any facts and inferences demonstrated by the plaintiff’s evidence.59
Judges also exercised considerable control over juries by ordering
new trials. The “new trial” eventually replaced the demurrer to the evidence
as the main jury control device and was ordered where the “verdict was
against the evidence at trial.”60 But taken together, the judge’s power to
decide cases through trial procedures like these was much weaker than it is
today through summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.61
C. The Reasoning for the Seventh Amendment’s Counterparts
For other individual rights from the Bill of Rights, the Court assesses
restrictions through a combination of the traditional tiers of scrutiny or other
forms of balancing and categorical rules.62 Balancing occurs when a
constitutional issue is resolved by assigning values to the interests at stake
and weighing them against one another.63 Typically, this involves whether
the “individual’s interest in asserting a right [outweighs] the government’s
interest in regulating it[] . . . .”64 The traditional tiers of scrutiny, even
including strict scrutiny, are also balancing tests.65 Strict scrutiny puts the
burden on the government to prove that a restriction is both necessary and that
the state’s interest in the restriction is compelling.66 The “necessity” prong
requires that the law is the least restrictive method to accomplish the law’s
end.67 If it is not the least restrictive means, then it is not necessary.68 Those
that argue that strict scrutiny is not a balancing test do so because they believe
57

Thomas, supra note 10, at 148–58 (discussing the variety of judicial procedures at common law).
See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 399–400 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing the
demurrer to the evidence as the most “prevalent” of the judicial devices at common law). But see Thomas,
supra note 10, at 151–52 (arguing the demurrer to the evidence was rarely used).
59
Galloway, 319 U.S. at 400 (Black, J., dissenting).
60
Id. at 400 (discussing how the new trial replaced the demurrer to the evidence as the key jury control
device); Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN.
L. REV. 903, 911 (1971) (describing when the new trial was ordered).
61
See infra Part III.B (demonstrating how summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law result
in more power for judges to take questions from juries than at common law).
62
An exception is the Second Amendment, which the Court has thus far, banned balancing for. See
infra note 283 and accompanying text.
63
See Aleinikoff, supra note 44, at 945 (defining balancing).
64
E.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 381 (2009).
65
See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“As in their original formulations, the successor strict and intermediate scrutiny tests applied
today remain quintessential balancing inquiries that focus ultimately on whether a particular government
interest is sufficiently compelling or important to justify an infringement on the individual right in
question.”).
66
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554 (4th. ed. 2011).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 556 n.17 (citing Simon & Schuster Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991)).
58
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it results in automatic protection for the right and does not really involve an
analysis.69
For category-based or “categorical reasoning,” in contrast to
balancing, the inquiry focuses only on whether the circumstances of a “case
fall[] “inside certain predetermined, outcome-determinative lines.”70 In the
Bill of Rights context, when the Court applies categorical rules instead of
balancing, the Court classifies the facts of the case to see if they trigger or
prevent the protection of a right. A declarant’s statement may not be admitted
against the accused without cross-examination if the statement is
“testimonial.”71 A speaker may have an absolute right to speak if the speech
falls within the political viewpoint category,72 or no speech protection at all if
they engage in obscenity.73 For each example, the outcome depends on
whether the features of the case fit within predetermined categories.
Still, categorical rules and balancing often work in tandem. In the
free speech context, for instance, restrictions of speech categories with high
First Amendment value like speech concerning matters of public concern, or
self-governance, trigger strict scrutiny.74 But for restrictions of more ordinary
categories like commercial speech, the Court applies intermediate balancing
because these restrictions are not as threatening to the First Amendment as
restrictions of speech affecting matters of public concern.75
As noted in Section II.B, the Seventh Amendment is different. While
it is governed by categorical rules like the law-fact distinction76 or the public
vs. private rights dichotomy,77 the Court has never applied the traditional tiers
69
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions Law: A
Case Study in Categorization and Balancing, 55 ALB. L. REV. 605, 606 (1992) (contending that, in practice,
strict scrutiny is a categorical rule, not a balancing test).
70
Blocher, supra note 64, at 381.
71
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
72
See Blocher, supra note 64, at 395 (noting the categorical protection of viewpoints). But see Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010) (noting an uncommon instance where a content-based
restriction of political speech was upheld).
73
Blocher, supra note 64, at 388–89.
74
See, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech
Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491–92 (2011) (discussing how restrictions of highly protected speech are
subject to strict scrutiny, but most speech does not fall within this category); Robert C. Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 604 (1990) (showing the value animating First Amendment
protection is the protection of public discourse). But see Eugene Volokh, The Trouble With “Public
Discourse” as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 567–68 (2011) (arguing that the
protection of public discourse fails to explain the Court’s approach to speech restrictions).
75
See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 19
(2000) (arguing that commercial speech receives less rigorous protection because of its attenuation from
public discourse, the animating value of the Court’s First Amendment approach).
76
See infra Part III.C (discussing the law-fact distinction’s role in allocating decision-making between
judge and jury).
77
See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323 (2011)). A right can be decided by Congressionally assigned legislative
court, rather than by the Judicial Branch, if it is a public right, that is, if it “is integrally related to particular
federal government action.” Id. at 2610.
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of scrutiny to assess the jury right. And balancing of any kind is deployed
rarely.78 And through this formalist approach, the Court has sanctioned every
judicial procedure it has reviewed that takes cases from the jury including
summary judgment, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and a robust motion to dismiss.79 But the most pervasive and damaging to the
jury is summary judgment. Trailing closely behind it is judgment as a matter
of law.
III. HOW BOTH MOTIONS UNDERMINE THE JURY RIGHT
The first Section of this Part describes the power judges have to take
cases from the jury through summary judgment and judgment as a matter of
law. Section B shows that judges had much less power at common law.
Section C demonstrates how categories determine when the use of summary
judgment is most threatening to the Seventh Amendment. Section D argues
for considering the non-movant’s interest in questions staying with the jury.
A. Overview of Summary Judgment and Judgment as a Matter of Law
Through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”80 The Court has interpreted this to mean that judgment should be
granted if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-movant.81
To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the non-movant must cite to
“particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials[] . . . .”82 To oppose summary
judgment, the non-movant must present evidence that can be made admissible
at trial.83
78
See infra Part VI.C (discussing the Court’s limited forays into balancing for the Seventh
Amendment).
79
See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1902) (upholding the
constitutionality of summary judgment); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659
(1935) (upholding the constitutionality of judgment notwithstanding the verdict); Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943) (directed verdict does not violate Seventh Amendment); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (requiring that allegations must “plausibly suggest” the claim, not
just be consistent with it to survive a motion to dismiss); Thomas, supra note 10, at 147 (arguing that the
Court’s approach to new procedures, that is, determining if they are like the procedures used at common
law has led the Court to approve every new procedure by which a court “removes cases from [the
determination of a jury] before, during, or after trials[] . . . .”); see also Joan E. Schaffner, The Seventh
Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, 31
U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 261–71 (2002) (discussing how the Court has historically deemphasized the jury’s
role when it comes to deciding a particular trial issue and enabling judicial review of jury decisions).
80
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
81
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
82
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
83
Id. at (c)(2).
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Early in Rule 56’s history, summary judgment could be defeated even
if there was the “slightest doubt as to the facts.”84 Moreover, as noted in the
Introduction, the Court cautioned against using the motion for decades, and
judges avoided granting it when issues of fact, such as credibility, remained.85
But the Summary Judgment Trilogy added three new hurdles to defeating
summary judgment: 1) it could be granted if “the moving party's evidence
[was] sufficient to render the plaintiff's claim implausible[;]” 2) the
heightened standard of proof required at trial by the substantive law would be
considered when determining if there is sufficient evidence of a genuine issue
of fact; and 3) a moving party could obtain summary judgment without
affirmative evidence, just by showing that there was no evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case.86
The motion for summary judgment is a pretrial motion. But the
movant can renew the same arguments later in a motion for judgment as a
matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, which is governed
by the same standard as summary judgment; that is, the motion will be granted
if a reasonable jury could not find for the non-movant.87 The Summary
Judgment Trilogy also strengthened the motion for judgment as a matter of
law because it gave judges more power to weigh the facts.88 This motion is
raised in two different stages.
After the non-movant has been fully heard on an issue, but before the
case is submitted to the jury, a party may bring a Rule 50(a) motion
challenging whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-movant.89 If the
motion is denied, the movant can renew the same argument again in a Rule
50(b) motion after the jury verdict and entry of judgment.90 In the Rule 50(b)
motion, the movant may 1) renew its request for judgment as a matter of law;
and 2) either request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under Rule
59.91

84
E.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (citing Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v.
United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1945)).
85
See Sward, supra note 10, at 625–26; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
86
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 1041 (describing the impact of the Summary Judgment Trilogy);
Suja A. Thomas, 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Triology: Reflections on Summary Judgment
Sponsored by Seattle University School of Law: Keynote: Before and After the Summary Judgment Trilogy,
43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 499, 500–01 (2012).
87
11 JAMES WM. MOORE , MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.04(2)(b) (Daniel R. Coquillette, et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2014).
88
See Stempel, supra note 8, at 157.
89
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); MOORE, supra note 87, at § 56.04(2)(b).
90
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). A party may only move for judgment as a matter of law under rule 50(b) if
they made the same motion before submission to the jury under Rule 50(a). E.g., JOSEPH W. GLANNON,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 521 (6th ed. 2008). The pre-verdict motion is
necessary so that the non-movant is alerted to possible defects in the case that the non-movant can correct
with additional evidence. MOORE, supra note 87, at § 56.04(2)(b). If the movant was able to raise the
motion for the first time post-verdict after the jury has already been discharged, the non-movant would
have no chance to correct problems with the case. Id.
91
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
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While summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law are
governed by the same standard, the record available to the judge varies greatly
between summary judgment and the motions under Rule 50.92 At the
summary judgment stage, there is only a paper record, including pleadings,
depositions, and answers to interrogatories. As a result, “the full scope or
subtle nuances of a case are [often] not apparent . . . .”93
But at the Rule 50 stage, the judge will have heard the live, public,
cross-examined testimony of witnesses, and may press those witnesses for
explanations to clear up any doubts.94 That is why the judge’s denial of a
summary judgment motion is not considered the final word on the matter.95
Instead, it is just a prediction at that early stage that “the evidence will be
sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the nonmovant[] . . . .”96 So while a
court may deny a summary judgment motion based on the paper record, it
may find ample reason to grant a judgment as a matter of law when it
entertains the Rule 50 motion.
As noted in the Introduction, concerns that the motions do not respect
the jury’s fact-finding role were amplified after the Summary Judgment
Trilogy. Critics feared that the new summary judgment and judgment as
matter of law would undermine the values animating the Seventh Amendment
discussed in Section II.A: preventing corruption, infusing the standards of the
common people into litigation, and instilling confidence in the litigation
system, unelected Article III judges, and democratic participation as a whole.
And many felt these concerns were justified by the behavior of judges
following the Summary Judgment Trilogy. Commentators argued that this
invigorated summary judgment led judges to grant it where issues of fact and
creditability remained.97 Others argued that judges more often “weighed”
facts, the province of the jury, when granting summary judgment rather than
determining whether there was insufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue
of fact.98 This seemed to confirm what the dissent in Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby predicted would happen if the standard of proof at trial was applied at
the summary judgment stage.99 Similarly, hard data showed judges were
more willing to grant summary judgment on fact-intensive inquiries that used

92
See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–52 (1986) (main difference between
summary judgment and directed verdict is timing and record).
93
MOORE, supra note 87, at § 56.04(2)(b).
94
Id. at § 56.04(2)(c).
95
Feld v. Feld, 688 F.3d 779, 781–82 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 891
(2011)).
96
Id. (quoting Chemetall GMBH v. ZR Energy, Inc., 320 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 2003)).
97
E.g., Sward, supra note 10, at 625–26.
98
See, e.g., Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 198
n.310 (2000) (lamenting the tendency of courts to weigh evidence to decide contested fact issues).
99
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 270–71 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(discussing the effect the Court’s ruling will have on lower courts).
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to make it to the jury.100 Ultimately, commentators argued that cases went to
the jury much less often than they did before the Summary Judgment
Trilogy.101 For many, it was difficult to escape the conclusion that the civil
jury trial entered an era of decline.
B. How Things Differed at Common Law
This strengthened summary judgment is all the more striking when
viewed in light of some of the judicial devices that existed at common law.
As discussed in Section II.B, through the demurrer to the evidence, a party
could obtain a decision on the law of the case by admitting any facts and
inferences demonstrated by the opposing party’s evidence. But because of
the risk involved in demurring to the evidence, there was little incentive to
withdraw the case from the jury before it reached a verdict. The demurring
party could not present her own evidence, and would not only have to admit
the truth of all the opposing party’s testimony against them, “but also
reasonable inferences [that] might be drawn from [the testimony] . . . .”102
Withdrawal of the case from the jury by the judge in this context
meant the demurring party had to “stake all on the success of the motion.”103
There is no such risk involved for the party moving for summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law. If the motion for summary judgment is denied,
the case proceeds to trial. And, if the motion for judgment as a matter of law
is denied, the case either proceeds to the jury or the jury’s verdict is
undisturbed.104 There was no danger that judges would weigh all the facts
through the demurrer to the evidence either. After all, the judge only
considered the opposing party's evidence and ultimately, the procedure was
actually used for questions of law, not questions of fact.105
Moreover, as mentioned in Section II.B, if a judge found a jury
verdict against the weight of the evidence, the judge would order a new trial
with a new jury. The judge would never determine that the evidence was
insufficient to support a jury verdict until after the jury actually returned a
100
Mollica, supra note 98, at 142 (using evidence from cases to show that prior to the Summary
Judgment Trilogy, judges rarely adjudicated state of mind and reasonableness questions through summary
judgment).
101
See, e.g., Patricia Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1945 (1998) (reviewing
D.C. Circuit’s summary judgment rulings over a six-month period and concluding that federal judges were
more likely to grant summary judgment than earlier in the rule’s history); Martin H. Redish, Summary
Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330
(2005) (using evidence to show that the Summary Judgment Trilogy resulted in a decrease in trials). But
see Joe S. Cecil, et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts,
4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 891 (2007) (showing evidence that summary judgment “activity”
increased prior to the Summary Judgment Trilogy).
102
E.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 402–03 (1943).
103
Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 33, 45 n.48.
104
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
105
Sward, supra note 10, at 600.
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verdict.106 And when the judge did, it was not because the judge found that
the jury’s verdict was unreasonable: at common law, the judge did not have
the power to apply the reasonable jury test.107 Instead, the standard applied
made it much harder to find that the facts could not support a jury verdict.108
And when the judge did so find, the remedy was still to order a new trial
instead of deciding who won because that was thought to involve factual
reevaluation by the court.109 For years, the Court echoed this common law
sentiment based on the belief that entering a judgment inconsistent with the
jury’s verdict would run afoul of the Reexamination Clause.110 Only in rare
cases would a common law judge reverse the jury’s verdict for a plaintiff and
enter judgment for the defendant.111 And that was only on questions of law,
not because the judge disagreed with the jury on the facts.112 Judges simply
had much less ability to decide pure questions of fact than they do today.113
Thus, summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law in their
current incarnations undermine the civil jury trial on two different levels.
First, the Summary Judgment Trilogy strengthened the motions to the point
that they have more power to take cases from the jury than when they were
codified through the Federal Rules. And second, judges had no such
comparable power over the jury’s fact-finding ability through judicial
procedures at common law.
C. Some Categories Matter More
But a popular response from supporters of the motions to these
charges is that actually, there is no danger that judges are intruding on the
jury’s fact-finding role: by definition, the motions are granted only where
there is no genuine dispute of any material fact.114 After all, as discussed in
Section II.B, the Court has held that a judicial procedure satisfies the
substance of the common law when the jury decides the issues of fact and the
106

Thomas, supra note 10, at 143.
Sward, supra note 10, at 636 (observing that there was no reasonable jury standard in eighteenth
century English cases).
108
See, e.g., id. at 579 n.34 (showing the limited ability of common law judges to order new trials when
disagreeing with the jury on facts).
109
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 400–01 (1943); see also Thomas, supra note 10, at 180
(noting, admiringly, the core principle of the common law that if the Court believed the evidence was
insufficient, it would order only a new trial, never order judgment for the moving party upon a review of
the sufficiency of the evidence).
110
See Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 423–24 (1913) (holding the Court was limited
to ordering a new trial because entering a judgment inconsistent with the jury’s verdict would violate the
Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment).
111
Thomas, supra note 10, at 158.
112
See Sward, supra note 10, at 624 (criticizing the court for finding that judgment notwithstanding
the verdict was similar to procedures at common law because when jury verdicts were “subject to later
decisions by the court on questions of law, the reserved questions . . . really were questions of law.”).
113
Id. at 636 (discussing how disputes over pure facts went to the jury at common law); see also infra
notes 130–32 and accompanying text (defining pure fact questions); see also infra pp. 23–25 (discussing
the Tolan v. Cotton case to show how much power judges have to decide pure fact questions today).
114
Thomas, supra note 10, at 161.
107

Published by eCommons, 2015

348

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

judge decides the issues of law. Thus, if only legal questions are disposed of
through summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, there is no
concern that the jury’s role is usurped. The problem with this response is that
there is not always a clear delineation between legal and factual questions to
determine whether questions should be before the judge or the jury.115
But even if the Court has not perfectly demarcated legal from factual
questions, courts still recognize questions as more factual or legal all the time.
Judges know whether they are dealing with an abstract legal question as
opposed to a mixed116 or pure fact question.117 Of course, the key summary
judgment inquiry is whether there is an issue of fact for the jury to decide.118
This in turn depends upon the evidence presented by the parties. The nature
of the issue itself is not all that matters. There is a reason appellate courts
review all summary judgment motions de novo:119 once there is no genuine
dispute of material fact, what remains is simply which party “is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”120
But the likelihood the judge is intruding on the jury’s role by
“weighing” facts to decide there is no issue of fact, increases with the “kind”
of question at stake. The different kinds of questions of law and fact operate
along a spectrum.121 With a strengthened summary judgment, the location of
the question determines how much the Seventh Amendment is threatened.122
Along the spectrum, there are three main categories of questions. The
more factual a question, the more it implicates constitutional concerns if the
judge, rather than the jury decides it. In contrast, the more legal a question,
the less constitutional significance if the question is taken away from the jury.
Furthest on the legal side of the spectrum is the “purely legal” question. If a
115
See Miller, supra note 3, at 1075 (discussing the lack of a clear delineation between the two
categories); see also Pullman-Standard Div. of Pullman v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (doubting
whether the Court could fashion a rule that would “unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal
conclusion.”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984) (acknowledging
complexities with distinguishing between questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law
and fact); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1769, 1770 (2003) (arguing that conceptually, law and fact do not “denote distinct ontological categories[]
. . . .”).
116
See, e.g., Kay v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 562 F. App’x. 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2014) (recognizing
the questions at issue were not purely legal, “which can be asked and answered without reference to the
facts of the case[,]” but instead required determining “whether a particular factual record does or does not
present a genuine issue of material fact.”); see also infra notes 125–30, 157–61 (defining purely legal and
mixed questions).
117
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 189–90 (noting that the appellate court granted summary
judgment on a qualified immunity claim resolving disputed facts like the prison guard’s knowledge of an
assault, and of the identity of the assailant); see also infra notes 131–54 and accompanying text (defining
pure fact questions).
118
E.g., Kay, 562 F. App’x at 385.
119
See, e.g., Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1988).
120
E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
121
See Miller, supra note 3, at 1082–83 (noting that there is a “spectrum” along which questions of
law and fact reside and that the jury is the “master” of some).
122
Id. at 1082.
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judge grants either motion on this category of question, then the jury’s factfinding role is not undermined.123 As shown in Section III.B, at common law,
when questions were withdrawn from the jury or a judge reversed the jury’s
verdict for a plaintiff in favor of a defendant, the judge was deciding questions
of law, not questions of fact. So, it could be said that this category of question
has no “coverage” or protection from the Seventh Amendment.124
But there are few “purely” legal questions. These are abstract
questions about the substance and clarity of pre-existing law.125 The answer
to the purely legal question will have general applicability to other disputes
because it does not rely on the facts of the case for its resolution.126 Examples
include when the Court determined that a cabinet officer is entitled to
qualified immunity instead of absolute immunity.127 Another example is
when the Court found that prisoners do not have a heightened burden of proof
in alleging retaliation for protected speech.128 In both examples, general
principles of law have been expressed that will not vary with a new fact
pattern.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the gravest threat to the jury
right occurs when the Court uses summary judgment to resolve disputes over
historical or “pure” fact questions. Pure facts are the “who, what, when,
where, and why” as it would have appeared to an “objective on-the-scene
observer[;]”129 non-physical findings, like what a person intended, knew or
believed;130 and, credibility determinations.131 As noted above, the jury is
supposed to be the master of these kinds of questions. But because summary
judgment enables the judge to decide what a reasonable factual dispute is (a

123
See Thomas, supra note 10, at 147 n.32. Except in the sense that deciding the question on summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law removes an entire case that would ordinarily be before the jury.
Craig M. Reiser, The Unconstitutional Application of Summary Judgment in Factually Intensive Inquiries,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 195, 196–97 (2009) (arguing that the “wrongful application” of summary judgment
could run afoul of the Seventh Amendment of the preservation requirement).
124
See Blocher, supra note 64, at 387–88 (discussing how certain categories of speech-like activity do
not result in First Amendment coverage or protection).
125
Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 190 (2011).
126
See, e.g., Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1867, 1869 (1966) (defining a clear legal question as establishing the rules that apply to the dispute at hand
and will also “have broad applicability to similar disputes.”).
127
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520–21 (1985) (holding cabinet officers are entitled only to
qualified immunity).
128
See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 582–601 (1998) (determining that the appellate court
erred when it “fashion[ed] a heightened burden of proof for unconstitutional-motive cases against public
officials.”).
129
See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 126, at 1870 (observing that the jury’s “role is to evaluate the evidence
and to reconstruct what took place, as it would have appeared to an objective on-the-scene observer.”).
130
See, e.g., James B. Thayer, “Law and Fact” in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 147, 152 (1890)
(“[M]ere thoughts, intentions, fancies of the mind, propositions, when conceived of as existing or being
true, are conceived of as facts.”).
131
E.g., Elaine D. Ingulli, Trial by Jury: Reflections on Witness Credibility, Expert Testimony, and
Recantation, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 145, 145 (1986).
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power common law judges did not have), the jury is no master at all.132
Recently, in Tolan v. Cotton, the Fifth Circuit demonstrated just how
judges use summary judgment to intrude on the jury’s pure fact territory.133
Robert Tolan claimed a police officer, Edward Cotton, used excessive force
when Cotton shot Tolan.134 When Cotton did, Tolan was unarmed and on the
front porch of his parents’ house.135 Cotton arrived thinking that a car had
been stolen and Tolan was behind the wheel.136 But the officer who radioed
Cotton for help incorrectly entered the car’s license plate number, which
matched a stolen car’s plates.137 When Cotton arrived, Tolan’s parents
attempted in vain to persuade both officers that both the car and the house
belonged to them.138
Cotton ordered Tolan’s mother to stand against the family’s
garage.
Tolan’s mother questioned the order and the situation quickly
escalated until Cotton fired three shots at Tolan, striking him three times.140
Tolan filed suit claiming, among other things, that Cotton used excessive
force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment for Cotton, holding that he did not use
unreasonable force.141 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds,
holding that even if Cotton did violate the Fourth Amendment, he was entitled
to qualified immunity.142
139

This violated the jury’s fact-finding role for several reasons. To
arrive at its conclusion, the court had to determine that Cotton did not violate
a “clearly established right.”143 When courts assess whether force is
unreasonable, the “clearly established” right is defined based on the “specific
context of the case.”144 But if the context is made up of contested facts, the
court cannot draw conclusions from those facts; that is up to the jury.
However, the Fifth Circuit did. The court concluded that an objectively
reasonable officer in Cotton’s position could have believed Tolan presented
an immediate threat to the officers.145 The court reached this conclusion based
on the following facts: the porch was poorly lit, Tolan’s mother did not obey
orders to remain calm, Tolan verbally threatened the officers, and most
132
See Sward, supra note 10, at 591–92 (recognizing that juries no longer decide the questions of fact
juries decided at common law).
133
Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2013).
134
Id. at 301.
135
Id. at 303.
136
Id. at 302.
137
Id. at 301.
138
Id. at 302.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 302–03.
141
Tolan v. Cotton, 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 477 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
142
Tolan, 713 F.3d at 306.
143
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014).
144
Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
145
Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865.
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importantly, Tolan moved to intervene as Cotton put his hands on his
mother.146
But each of these facts were in doubt. All of the evidence that began
at the moment Cotton ordered Tolan’s mother against the garage door, and
ended with Cotton shooting Tolan, was in dispute. Even though the court
concluded that the porch was dark, Tolan presented evidence the porch was
well lit.147 On whether Tolan’s mother remained calm, Cotton presented
evidence that Tolan’s mother flipped her arm and told Cotton to take his hands
off her after Cotton ordered her against the garage door.148 But Tolan
presented evidence that Cotton slammed his mother against the garage door
when she questioned Cotton’s order.149 Also, Tolan’s mother testified that
she was not aggravated when Cotton ordered her against the garage door.150
Regarding Tolan’s attempt to intervene between Cotton and Tolan’s
mother, the court credited Cotton’s version too. Tolan, who was face down
on the ground when Cotton attempted to restrain his mother, testified that he
only rose to his knees, but the court seemed to accept testimony that Tolan
rose to his feet and took a charging position towards Cotton.151 Despite these
conflicting facts, the court still concluded that no genuine dispute of material
fact existed for whether Cotton’s use of deadly force was objectively
unreasonable in light of clearly-established law.152
This is exactly the kind of dispute over pure facts juries decided at
common law.153 As shown in Section III.B, through the demurrer to the
evidence, the judge could only consider the evidence of the nonmoving party,
in this case the victim, Tolan. The judge would not be able to weigh all the
facts, including Cotton’s side of the story. And if a jury had been allowed to
return a verdict, and the judge thought it was against the evidence, all the
judge could have done is order a new trial; the judge could not reverse
judgment in favor of the movant. So today, when judges decide these pure
questions of fact, their actions strike at a core value the Seventh Amendment
was intended to protect, the fact-finding function of the jury. As a result,
judges should be categorically proscribed from resolving pure questions of
fact through summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law.154
The final category is the mixed question, which is located in the
middle of the spectrum. It poses a similar, albeit less direct threat to the
146

Id.
Id. at 1867.
148
Id. at 1864.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1867.
151
Id.
152
Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2013).
153
See Sward, supra note 10, at 636.
154
See Blocher, supra note 64, at 393–95 (discussing how restrictions of particular viewpoints are
categorically banned because they strike at the core values the First Amendment protects).
147
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Seventh Amendment than the pure fact question when adjudicated through
summary judgment. What distinguishes a mixed question from the other
categories is that it entails elements of both law and fact.155 For example, the
judge may determine that there is First Amendment protection when a public
employee speaks as a private citizen and suffers adverse employment action.
The jury may then determine what the employee said that led to the adverse
employment action. But what remains is the determination that the employee
spoke as a private citizen.
This is where mixed questions form. As opposed to pure legal
questions that resolve general principles, mixed question findings are unique
to the facts of each case: whether the speaker is speaking as a private citizen
is a different assessment with each new speaker and the unique circumstances
surrounding the speech. And, unlike pure fact-findings, the mixed question
asks more than just what happened.
Since mixed questions blend legal interpretation with fact-finding,
there is no uniform approach for the appellate review.156 Nonetheless, many
are traditionally jury questions.157 And, the overlap between factual inference
and legal interpretation makes it difficult to say with confidence that a mixed
question ever truly presents a “purely legal question.”158 Resolving them
rarely requires the skills unique to a lawyer either like fashioning rules that
respect the separation of powers or assessing the state of constitutional law in
decades past.159
For these reasons, as noted in Section III.A, before the Summary
Judgment Trilogy, judges avoided granting summary judgment on mixed
questions for fear of trampling on the jury’s fact-finding role. Like pure
questions of fact, if a mixed question is transformed by the judge into a legal
one it is not because the question lacks factual content. It is either because
155
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1094 (9th ed. 2009) (defining mixed questions as questions that
involve elements of law and fact). Mixed questions are also referred to as “law application,” “mixed
questions of law and fact” or as questions of “ultimate fact.” See MOORE, supra note 87, at § 56.24(5)
(there is a great deal of overlap between the terms “mixed question of law and fact” and “ultimate fact”);
Weiner, supra note 126, at 1874 (equating law application with mixed issues). Some argue that an ultimate
fact is distinguishable from a classic mixed question because it “more clearly implies the application of
standards of law[] . . . .” E.g., MOORE, supra note 87, at § 56.24(5) (quoting Baumgartner v. United States,
332 U.S. 665, 671 (1944)); see also Sward, supra note 10, at 574 (distinguishing mixed questions as
separate from questions of ultimate fact). An example of an ultimate fact under this definition would be a
finding that defendant is negligent. MOORE, supra note 87, at § 56.24(5). But on the other hand, many
categorize negligence as a mixed question. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 126, at 1878–79 (noting how
courts characterize negligence); Thayer, supra note 130, at 169 (categorizing negligence as a mixed
question).
156
CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2589 (3d ed. 2008).
157
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1094 (9th ed. 2009) (mixed questions are usually jury questions).
158
See, e.g., Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 51 F.3d 1229, 1236 (4th
Cir. 1995) (observing that the appeal of a contract interpretation ruling inevitably involves important
factual inquiries and is unlikely to present discrete legal issues).
159
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530–35 (discussing the considerations of separation of
powers in fashioning an immunity rule for attorney general and assessing state of constitutional law on
wiretapping in 1970).
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the judge has decided there is only one reasonable conclusion or because
courts arbitrarily define it as a question of law.160 Indeed, there are numerous
examples of mixed questions, ranging from probable cause in malicious
prosecution cases, to “citizen vs. employee speech[,]” or “fair use” in
copyright cases, being treated as pure questions of law.161 They are
categorized this way even though they involve relating the law to the facts,
not merely resolving general principles.
At common law, juries decided mixed questions as well. Judges had
the same limited power to take mixed questions away from juries as they did
pure facts: through the demurrer to the evidence, a mixed question could be
withdrawn from the jury but only the opposing party’s evidence would be
considered by the judge. And if the judge disagreed with the jury’s verdict,
the most the judge could do is order a new trial.
Still, as discussed in Section II.B, to be faithful to the Court’s test for
whether a procedure satisfies the substance of common law, the jury is to
decide facts, not facts mixed with law. The core protection of the Seventh
Amendment is that juries decide questions of fact, not mixed questions. So
when judges decide mixed questions through summary judgment, it threatens
the Seventh Amendment. But, the threat is not as severe as when judges
resolve pure questions of fact through summary judgment.
Thus, the mixed question should not result in categorical protection
of the non-movant’s Seventh Amendment jury interest. Nor should the mixed
question trigger a categorical ban of adjudication through summary judgment
or judgment as a matter of law. Instead, the judge’s options should be limited
when the judge determines the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on a mixed question.162
D. Why Consider the Interests?
It goes without saying that judges do not observe these categorical
boundaries. Summary judgment is granted on mixed and pure fact questions

160
See Sward, supra note 10, at 579 (observing that “classifying issues as fact or law is reflected in
some rather arbitrary historical characterizations of adjudicatory tasks.”).
161
See Weiner, supra note 126, at 1913–14 (criticizing the treatment of probable cause in malicious
prosecution cases as a legal question); Sarah L. Fabian, Comment, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Whether an
Employee Speaks as a Citizen or as a Public Employee - Who Decides?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1675,
1696–98 (2010) (criticizing circuit courts for treating the fact-intensive threshold inquiry of citizen speech
versus employee speech as a question of law); Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts
in Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 556 (2010) (criticizing modern
judges' treatment of fair use in copyright cases as a pure issue of law, which used to be treated as an issue
of fact).
162
See infra Part IV.A (noting how restrictions of speech categories with high First Amendment value
are permitted if they pass strict scrutiny, while restrictions with even stronger First Amendment value
(political viewpoints) are categorically banned, and restrictions of speech-like activity with no First
Amendment value (obscenity) are not covered by First Amendment protection at all).
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all the time.163 The Court does not recognize that the non-movant may have
a stronger interest in a jury trial based on the question-category raised in the
motion. This does not make sense. The non-movant’s interest should not be
ignored. As discussed in Section II.B, in other areas of the law, charges that
formalist reasoning fails to grasp the impact on parties has led the Court to
consider the interests at stake.
And here, there are two main critiques of the Court’s formalist
reasoning. First, that the Court’s common law assessment of new judicial
procedures has steadily undermined the jury, particularly through summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law. The second critique is the
formalism underlying the Summary Judgment Trilogy. For the first critique,
as discussed in Section II.B, the Court mechanically analogized to the
common law to see whether summary judgment, the directed verdict, and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict were similar to procedures used at
common law. In this assessment of the common law, the Court failed to grasp
just how much power juries held.164 For the second critique, as shown in
Section III.A, the Court erected hurdles to defeating summary judgment. In
so doing, it undermined the right of many to try cases before the civil jury.
The common thread of both critiques is also the main criticism of
formalist reasoning itself: the Court did not consider the impact it would have
on the interest of litigants who want to try cases before the jury.165 In
upholding procedures based on the Court’s assessment of the common law, it
brushed aside suggestions that litigants would have less access to the jury than
at common law.166 In strengthening summary judgment, the Court dismissed
the idea that many worthy plaintiffs would never see the jury.167
But there are two reasons why commentators likely have not
advocated for balancing to replace formalism. First, because the text of the
Seventh Amendment uniquely commands that the civil jury right be
“preserved” as it was at common law, it would seem to preclude weighing
opposing interests at stake to determine if the jury right should apply.168
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, balancing’s reputation is
questionable, as some argue balancing downgrades even fundamental rights
163
The “see, e.g.,” in this footnote could span the rest of this Article. For representative examples, I
draw the reader’s attention back to Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) and supra notes 118–19.
164
See supra Part III.B (discussing how summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law did not
exist at common law); Sward, supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting arguments from Professors
Thomas and Sward that summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law did not exist at common law).
165
See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (defining formalism as rigidly applying rules without
considering the real-world impact on the parties).
166
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389–90 (1943).
167
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Our holding that the clear-andconvincing standard of proof should be taken into account in ruling on summary judgment motions does
not denigrate the role of the jury.”).
168
See Miller, supra note 22, at 901 (“The Seventh Amendment textual command to ‘preserve’ drives
the historical test[] . . . .”). But see pp. 61–62 (discussing reasons why the Seventh Amendment’s text does
not preclude balancing).
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by evaluating restrictions with low levels of scrutiny.169 Most commentators
take the view that the Court’s approach to the Seventh Amendment is more
protective of the right than open-ended balancing or balancing under the
traditional tiers of scrutiny would be.170
But balancing tests are not inherently flawed. They fail as rightprotectors because the proper constraints are not worked into the test,
allowing the personal values of judges to overwhelm the analysis. Thus,
without the proper framework constraining judicial discretion, a balancing
approach does empower courts to render the right a “nullity.”171
To the extent the civil jury right has experienced erosion, blame
cannot be placed at balancing’s doorstep. After all, it is barely ever used.172
At the same time, it cannot be said the Court’s formalist approach to the
Seventh Amendment has undermined the right wholesale. The historical test
has actually resulted in more causes of action requiring the jury trial than were
recognized at common law.173 In view of the Court’s approach to new judicial
procedures, its formalist, analogical reasoning has upheld every one that takes
cases out of the hands of the jury.174
Thus, what if instead of criticism of the reconstituted summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law on the Court’s terms, summary
judgment, and judgment as a matter of law were recast in terms of the
litigants’ Seventh Amendment interests? For other rights from the Bill of
Rights, the Court recognizes that the right-holder’s interest in exercising a
right is greater in some cases than others. Should not the Seventh Amendment
interest of a non-movant vary based on the kind of question raised in the
motion?
IV. APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
Section A of this Part explains how questions with high Seventh
169
See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales
Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1185 (1988) (discussing the
general problems with low level scrutiny balancing).
170
See Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 516–17 (1976) (arguing that an informal balancing test
to determine whether a litigant has a right to jury trial constitutes “an effective judicial repeal of the seventh
amendment.”); Miller, supra note 22, at 856 (applauding the historical test as opposed to balancing under
the traditional tiers of scrutiny: “[P]rocess of reasoning by historical analogy drives the Seventh
Amendment inquiry in a way that far surpasses the Court’s approach to other provisions in the Bill of
Rights.”).
171
John S. Elson, Balancing Costs in Constitutional Construction: The Burger Court's Expansive New
Approach, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 160, 161 (1979).
172
Miller, supra note 22, at 872.
173
Id. (“[T]he Court’s use of the historical test—and especially analogical reasoning from history—
has stretched the Seventh Amendment’s protections to cover far more legal controversies than a strict
reading of history would permit.”); see also Schaffner, supra note 79, at 256 (the Court has “safely
guarded” the preservation of the right to a jury trial in cases determining legal rights).
174
Schaffner, supra note 79.
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Amendment value can be protected from summary judgment and judgment
as a matter of law. Section B applies the first part of strict scrutiny, the
compelling interest test, to both motions. Section C applies the “means”
assessment to both motions. Section D concludes by summarizing how strict
scrutiny will apply to both motions.
A. How Categories Can Determine the Seventh Amendment’s Protection
As discussed in Section III.C, Seventh Amendment values dictate that
certain categories of questions, be determined by the jury rather than the
judge. Just as other rights from the Bill of Rights value certain categories
covered by the right more than others.175 As noted in Section II.C, in the First
Amendment context, speech with the highest First Amendment value, such as
political viewpoints, cannot be restricted. But, viewpoint neutral restrictions
of speech that cover matters of public concern, are subject to strict scrutiny.
Finally, speech-like activity with no First Amendment value is categorically
excluded from First Amendment protection.
Likewise, the closer a question is to a pure fact, the more resolving it
through summary judgment would trample on a core value of the Seventh
Amendment.176 If summary judgment is used to adjudicate disputed pure
facts, then the Seventh Amendment interest of the non-movant is so high that
no consideration of the government interest is warranted. As discussed in
more detail in Section III.C, it should be categorically prohibited like a
viewpoint restriction in the speech context. But, if the question is purely legal,
then the protection of the Seventh Amendment is not triggered as the
protection of the First Amendment is not for obscenity. Since there is no
Seventh Amendment protection for purely legal questions for the reasons
discussed in Section III.C, there is no need to scrutinize whether it is
appropriate for the judge to grant summary judgment or judgment as a matter
of law.
The means used by the government are scrutinized in the free speech
context for the important speech categories. For instance, as noted above, a
content-based restriction of speech affecting matters of public concern is
subject to strict scrutiny. The analog to this speech category in the summary
judgment context is the mixed question. The non-movant has a strong interest
in a jury trial for these questions, so there is protection from the Seventh
Amendment. But it is not as important to the Seventh Amendment that a
mixed question be decided by a jury, (as discussed in Section III.C, it is
diluted by the legal content) as it is with a pure fact question. Thus, the
175
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fisher, Just Right?: Assessing the Rehnquist Court’s Parting Words on Criminal
Justice: Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1496 (2006)
(noting how the Court held that any “testimonial” statements requires confrontation).
176
See supra pp. 347–48 (observing how the Seventh Amendment values the resolution of pure fact
questions through the jury).
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government may restrict it so long as the government’s interest is strong
enough and the means used are properly tailored.
Ordinarily, at this “sub-categorical” level,177 the Court’s approach to
summary judgment diverges from the Court’s approach to free speech. The
individual’s free speech interest increases based on the importance of the
speech involved. But the non-movant’s interest in a jury trial does not
increase with the category of the question raised on summary judgment. As
a corollary, there is no scrutiny of the “means” used by the judge to determine
if they are proper. However, we have defined which questions trigger Seventh
Amendment protection and for which questions it is most important that a
jury decides them. As speech categories determine how restrictive the
government’s means used may be, this lays the path to scrutinize the means
used under summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.
B. Is there a Compelling Government Interest?
Of course, as discussed in Section II.C, the first step in assessing
whether a restriction passes strict scrutiny is whether the government has a
compelling interest. The political branches do not have to be the actor
involved in order for a government interest to be promoted. Judicial action
may advance state interests that are ultimately balanced against the individual
right interest.178 The government interest in judges granting summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law is in having autonomous federal
judges who are able to efficiently dispose of cases and trim excess fat from
the litigation system.179 A related government interest is in having judges
adjudicate complex questions as opposed to juries who may be prone to
irrational decision-making. In other words, the government has an interest in
having cases decided accurately.180
But a government interest in “efficiency” does not exactly rise to the
level of interests one thinks of as “compelling” like combating international
terrorism, or remedying specific acts of racial discrimination.181 Still, it is
conceivable that a government interest in efficiency could pass strict scrutiny.
177
Blocher, supra note 64, at 395 (discussing free speech analysis once it is determined speech is
involved: “core values enables courts to accord lessened protection to covered subcategories that are not
proximate to those values (a question of subcategorization) . . . .”).
178
See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (acknowledging state interests served by judicial
decisions interfering with confrontation rights of the accused); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1983)
(weighing the state interests served by judge’s decision not to grant a continuance “in terms of witnesses,
records, and fading memories, to say nothing of misusing judicial resources.”).
179
While the conventional wisdom is that summary judgment promotes efficiency, there are arguments
that eliminating it could result in efficiencies as well. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 10, at 177–78 (arguing
that eliminating summary judgment could induce parties to settle for fear of losing at trial).
180
It is not necessarily true that judges decide questions more accurately than juries; both sides of the
debate could point to studies that support or oppose that conclusion. See Priest, supra note 40.
181
See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (discussing the compelling interest in
remedying past and present discrimination by a state actor); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
1, 29–32 (2010) (finding the U.S. government interest in combating international terrorism compelling).
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For instance, the Court arguably recognized that developing rules of evidence
tailored to a state’s particular needs is compelling.182 This is a state interest
similar to the one motivating Rules 50 and 56.
What undermines the government’s position is not necessarily the
interest itself, but that the interest flouts the very purpose behind the Seventh
Amendment. The Seventh Amendment was created to check judges and the
sovereign, and to instill community standards into the litigation system.
Ultimately, it exists to foster democratic participation. It may be true that it
is more efficient to have non-jury civil trials, but the Framers did not care.
Efficiency had nothing to do with enshrining a civil jury right. Both summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law promote a goal in the litigation
context at odds with the goals of the Framers: the efficient disposition of cases
was encouraged at the expense of the values a civil jury trial was intended to
promote.
Contrast this with other compelling interests recognized by the Court
and their relationship to the right is restricted. A restriction of speech to
address a fleeting security interest is not necessarily the promotion of a value
at odds with the values animating the First Amendment, such as the promotion
of public discourse. Security is not necessarily incompatible with free speech.
To the contrary, some measure of it is needed in order for people to line the
streets and picket. However, the efficient disposition of issues of fact by a
judge or adjudication through the civil jury, are completely contradictory
aims.
One might counter then that another motivation for the Seventh
Amendment was to instill confidence in the litigation system. The Court has
noted time and again that a jury composed of twelve common people would
more accurately decide issues of fact than just one judge.183 But another
concern is the fear of jury irrationality and bias when there may be insufficient
evidence, especially in complex cases. One could argue then that new
research shows judges are more likely to render accurate decisions through
summary judgment than juries. But as noted earlier, the research is not
conclusive on whether judges adjudicate issues more accurately than juries.184
So this argument does not warrant judges deciding questions that juries
should.
A related concern is who benefits from summary judgment? One
purpose of the Seventh Amendment was to instill the standards of the

182
See Fisher, supra note 175, at 1507 (arguing that the balancing test crafted by the Court in Ohio v.
Roberts used in the Confrontation Clause context was tantamount to strict scrutiny); see also Roberts, 448
U.S. at 64 (recognizing interests like developing the rules of evidence could justify restricting the right to
confrontation).
183
See, e.g., supra note 37 and accompanying text.
184
See Priest, supra note 40.
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common people into the litigation system.185 What does it say about the
government interest here that summary judgment and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have grown to disproportionately benefit elites? As the Rules
have grown more restrictive over the years, they have promoted the interests
of the corporate defendants represented by multinational law firms.186
Restrictive rules undermine the effectiveness of smaller plaintiffs’ firms with
less experience and resources far more than they do the large multinational
law firms.187 The Summary Judgment Trilogy continued this trend: summary
judgment is more restrictive of the jury trial and less likely to be defeated
when raised by corporate defendants.188 This has serious implications for the
common people who need litigation to redress injury at the hands of corporate
elites.
Thus, the government’s interest in summary judgment and judgment
as a matter of law is dubious, not compelling. But one feature of both motions
might convince the Court that the interest served by them is important enough
to protect their longstanding use and the fear that invalidating them would
have a chaotic impact on the federal courts. The Court has shown leeway
towards longstanding traditions in other contexts even if there may have
technically been a constitutional violation.189
One might also contend that the movant's interest in avoiding the
burden of trial through summary judgment should somehow factor into the
equation. As noted in Section II.B, avoiding unnecessary trials was reflected
by stringent common law pleading and, by demurrer practice. By this
reasoning, summary judgment serves more than just the government’s interest
in efficiency. It also serves the individual-movant’s interest in avoiding an
unnecessary trial. Typically, as noted in Section II.C, the Court balances
government interests against individual interests to adjudicate constitutional
disputes. But the Court has also recognized that important individual interests
carried out by the government can justify restrictions of rights.190 Indeed, on
185

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 505–09 (2012)
(arguing that the approach towards rules of procedure has shifted from a “liberal ethos” to a “restrictive
ethos”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 51 ALA.
L. REV. 529, 530 (2001) (examining activity surrounding the 2000 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and finding the process substantially captured by defense interests, particularly those of
product liability defendants); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Not So Peaceful Coexistence: Inherent Tensions
in Addressing Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 337, 373 (2003) (discussing how tort reformers prefer a system
emphasizing speed and cost reduction rather than accuracy and recovery for plaintiffs). Although, the
small business owner could also argue that a strengthened summary judgment is an asset, since litigation
is a greater financial threat than it is for large corporations. Id.
187
Coleman, supra note 186, at 512 (arguing large corporate firms have much more “collective
knowledge” and resources to boot to benefit them in litigation than small firms and solo practitioners do).
188
Id. at 507 n.26.
189
See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (holding that “[i]n light of the unambiguous
and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative
sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.”).
190
See Aleinikoff, supra note 44, at 981 (discussing how public and individual interests are often on
the same side).
186

Published by eCommons, 2015

360

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

rare occasions, courts have recognized that the due process interest of a
litigant in avoiding a jury trial justifies restricting the Seventh Amendment
interest of the opposing party.191
So assume for a moment that the Court grasps at enough straws to
find that the government’s interest served by summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law is compelling. That means both motions pass the
first part of strict scrutiny. Whether the motions pass the test in full depends
on how restrictive they are.
C. The Least Restrictive Alternative Means?
As discussed in Section IV.A, the kind of question raised on summary
judgment determines the kind of Seventh Amendment protection. If it is a
pure fact, the judge is categorically prohibited from adjudicating it through
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. If it is a pure legal
question, there is no Seventh Amendment protection. But if it is a mixed
question, then there is a “means” assessment where the Court’s action is
assessed for its restrictiveness. Two forces contribute to the restrictiveness of
the judge’s action: 1) when the judgment is granted; and 2) what the judge
actually orders.
1. The Record and Access to the Jury
As noted above, the record develops from just a paper record with
each renewal under Rule 50 in the district court.192 The later the decision is
granted, the more the judge perceives the full scope and subtle nuances of the
case based on the live, cross-examined testimony of witnesses. Thus, a trial
judge’s decision granting judgment as a matter of law stands a better chance
of getting the decision right than a decision granting summary judgment.193
A decision through a Rule 50 motion is superior to a pretrial decision because
a “fully developed record available to a court considering a motion for
judgment as a matter of law gives the court a greater opportunity to assess the
matter . . . .”194 Thus, a court is more restrictive of the non-movant’s interest
in having a jury decide the case when a judge grants summary judgment, as
opposed to judgment as a matter of law. If the motion is granted prior to trial,

191
See infra notes 274–76 and accompanying text (discussing complexity exception to the Seventh
Amendment).
192
See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
193
See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 87, at § 56.04(2)(e) (noting how a “more fully developed record
available to a court considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law gives the court a greater
opportunity to assess the matter.”) (citation omitted). Of course, some cases have nothing but a paper
record, and witnesses are just document custodians. So this “record-development” principle requires live
witnesses and cross-examined testimony.
194
Id.
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the court’s action is less justifiable than a motion granted after a jury trial.195
Moreover, from a purely objective standpoint, the non-movant has
had the least amount of access to the jury at the summary judgment stage
(none at all) as opposed to the Rule 50 stage. The less access to the jury, the
less the jury's presence may impact the trial as a whole. For instance, the
presence of the jury imposes on litigants a “fierce discipline” to break down
complex cases and make them understandable.196 Thus, a judge granting
judgment as a matter of law later in the litigation may be indirectly affected
by the jury. A summary judgment motion, granted prior to trial, has no chance
of being influenced by the jury’s presence.
Finally, that summary judgment is more restrictive is plain from the
non-movant’s perspective. Assume a plaintiff files suit against a corporation
for asbestos exposure in a district with a significant history of asbestos
exposure. The corporation moves for summary judgment. If you gave the
non-movant-employee the choice between having a case decided by a jury or
a judge, surely the non-movant would prefer the jury. But if instead the choice
was between a judge who had seen only a paper record and a judge who
observed the live, cross-examined testimony of company personnel, the nonmovant would prefer the latter just the same.
2. The Effect of the Judge’s Order
In addition to when the motion is granted, what the judge actually
does with the motion determines how restrictive the court’s action is. When
ruling on a dispositive motion for summary judgment, the judge may either
grant it, or allow the case to proceed to trial.197 When ruling on the renewed
motion under Rule 50(a), the judge may grant it or submit the case to the
jury.198 And when ruling on the renewal under Rule 50(b), the judge may: (1)
uphold the jury’s verdict; (2) “order a new trial; or, (3) direct the entry of
judgment as a matter of law.”199

195
See Thomas, supra note 10, at 176–77 (arguing that because it occurs prior to trial, summary
judgment is the “least justifiable” among it, the directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
196
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial
Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 54 (1977).
197
Both summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law may raise questions that, when granted,
do not end the entire case. See, e.g., Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 327 (1967)
(distinguishing instances where Rule 50 motions raise non-dispositive issues and dispositive issues of law
which, “must necessarily terminate the litigation.”). This, of course, affects the restrictiveness calculus
considerably since adjudication of a side issue does not preclude the non-movant's access to the jury for
the case as a whole.
198
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
199
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
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3. The Full “Means” Assessment
The timing of the motion, combined with the action the judge takes,
results in different levels of restrictiveness on the non-movant’s Seventh
Amendment right:
No restriction: if the judge denies the summary judgment
motion and allows the case to proceed to trial. Then in that
case, the non-movant’s Seventh Amendment interest is not
impacted. Nor is it if the judge entertains a renewed motion
under Rule 50(a) and allows the case to go to the jury or
allows the judgment on the verdict after a Rule 50(b) motion.
Least restrictive: in ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion, the judge
orders a new trial. While the jury verdict has been reversed,
the court has not directed the entry of judgment against the
non-movant. A new trial is a less drastic course of action
because the non-movant will have another day in court with
another jury and it does not run afoul of the Reexamination
Clause.200 This is also how judges dealt with jury verdicts
against the weight of the evidence at common law. The judge
also rendered the decision with access to the live, crossexamined testimony of the witnesses and will have a much
better sense of the nuances of the case than if only the
summary judgment record were available. The non-movant
has had full access to the jury and the jury’s presence
plausibly impacted the presentation of the case to the judge.
Restrictive: in ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion, the judge
directs the entry of judgment against the non-movant. The
decision is based on a fully developed record, which
increases the judge’s grasp of the case, and the non-movant
has had full access to the jury. But the judge has overturned
the jury’s verdict and the non-movant does not get another
chance before a different jury.
More restrictive: in ruling on a Rule 50(a) motion, the judge
directs the entry of judgment against the non-movant. The
non-movant never gets a decision from the jury and the
difference in the record between a Rule 50(a) motion and a
Rule 50(b) motion can still be substantial. While the record
for both motions is superior to the summary judgment record,
the judge granting a Rule 50(a) motion does not benefit from

200

See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
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the arguments raised in the post-verdict motion.201 Nor will
the judge benefit from the verdict itself, which can solve
questions of fact against the post-verdict movant and
emphasize the importance of legal issues.202
Most restrictive: the court grants a summary judgment
motion. The decision is based on only a paper record, and
the court will not benefit from the live, cross-examined
testimony at trial to heighten its grasp of the case. Most
importantly, the non-movant never gets a chance to bring the
case before the jury.
D. The Test in Full
To summarize, the constitutionality of summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law will depend on how restrictive of the nonmovant’s Seventh Amendment right, the court’s action is. This depends first
on the category of the question raised in the motion. Second, after it is
determined, the category triggers Seventh Amendment protection, the
“means” assessment ensues. The analysis would play out as follows:
1. Is the question a pure fact, pure law, or mixed question?
2. If it is a pure fact question, there is an absolute Seventh
Amendment interest and there can be no judgment
granted on the motion. If it is a core legal question there
is no Seventh Amendment interest and the means used
by the judge are not scrutinized.
3. If it is a mixed question, then the “means” assessment:
a. Was summary judgment granted? That is most
restrictive. It is also unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny.
b. In ruling on a Rule 50(a) motion, did the judge
direct the entry of judgment against the nonmovant? That is still restrictive, and it is
unconstitutional.
c. In ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion, did the judge
direct the entry of judgment against the nonmovant? Though less restrictive, it is still

201
See Unitherm Food Sys. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 401 n.3 (2006) (discussing the benefits
of post-verdict motion).
202
See Johnson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 53 (1952) (discussing how the “verdict
solves factual questions against the post-verdict movant and thus emphasizes the importance of the legal
issues.”).
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unconstitutional.
d. In ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion, did the judge
order a new trial? That is the least restrictive
alternative based on the levels of restrictive
action discussed above. Thus, it is the only time
a Rule 50 motion is constitutional under strict
scrutiny.
Requiring the least restrictive means does not simply replicate the
summary judgment standard itself. It does not mean that the use of summary
judgment to adjudicate pure fact disputes is unconstitutional only in some
cases, as applied to some facts.203 To the contrary, the judge no longer has
the power to determine whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. As noted in Section III.B, judges had no such power at common law.
So judges will not under strict scrutiny. Instead, the judge’s power at the
summary judgment stage will be limited to recognizing what kind of question
is raised in the motion. If it is purely factual, it goes to the jury. If it is purely
legal, the judge has the power to grant summary judgment. If it is mixed, it
likewise must proceed to the jury. As discussed above, the judge’s assessment
at the Rule 50(a) stage will be the same.
Finally, at the Rule 50(b) stage, as at the summary judgment stage, it
is not as if the motion is only unconstitutional as applied to some facts.204
Rather, the judge does not have the power to grant judgment as a matter of
law on a question of pure fact. But unlike the other motions, the judge does
have the power to overturn the jury on a mixed question. As discussed in
Section III.B, if the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the
judge may order a new trial as common law judges did.
One might argue that this balancing-categorical blend cannot work
like it does for free speech because questions do not fit into the “fact” and
“law” categories as neatly as speech fits into the “commercial” or “political
viewpoint” category, as the case may be. After all, whether a question can be
truly “factual” or “legal” has long vexed the Court and commentators alike.205
But high valued speech is not always easy to disentangle from less valued
speech either. Sometimes it is difficult to determine which category of speech
is at stake.206 Nonetheless, the Court still relies on speech categories to

203
As the plaintiff argued for the directed verdict in Galloway, that is, it was unconstitutional as applied
only to the facts. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 373 (1943) (“The constitutional argument, as
petitioner has made it, does not challenge generally the power of federal courts to withhold or withdraw
from the jury cases in which the claimant puts forward insufficient evidence to support a verdict.”). Id.
Galloway did not argue that the directed verdict was unconstitutional in all its applications. Id.
204
Id.
205
See supra note 116.
206
See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 64, at 390 (differentiating categories of speech is “rarely an easy
task.”); Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1180–81
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determine how restrictive government action may be. More importantly, as
discussed above, judges recognize whether questions are legal or factual in
nature all the time, despite the academic doubts.207 A response might be that
just because judges recognize the difference between questions of law and
fact that will not prevent judges from categorizing questions of fact as
questions of law. But we trust judges to respond accordingly based on the
category of speech restricted. By applying strict scrutiny to assess summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law, judges will incur the same
obligation.
Under this approach, summary judgment would only be
constitutional to adjudicate purely legal questions. And Rule 50 motions
could still be raised to adjudicate a mixed question, but the most the judge can
do is order a new trial.208 This begs the question: why should the course of
action described as “less restrictive” be unconstitutional? What justifies
requiring the “least” restrictive means?
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR STRICT SCRUTINY
This Part offers justifications for strict scrutiny from the importance
of the civil jury right, to the inability of formalist reasoning, to satisfy the
substance of the common law and, finally, the danger that the Court could
utilize other less protective balancing tests.
A. A Fundamental Right
What justifies disturbing the Court’s entrenched formalism and
applying strict scrutiny to assess restrictions of the Seventh Amendment? For
(2012) (observing that “[i]t is often difficult to separate and identify expression that serves only individual
development or only matters of societal interest, or that contributes to both.”).
207
See, e.g., supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (demonstrating examples of judges
differentiating pure legal from mixed and factual questions).
208
The language of Rules 56 & 50 would have to change substantially to remain constitutional under
strict scrutiny. Rules 56 and 50(a) would have to reflect that the judge’s power to grant the movant
judgment as a matter of law is limited to purely legal questions. To comply, Rule 56(a)'s language must
be changed as follows: instead of having the power to grant summary judgment when there is no issue of
material fact, the language must reflect that judgment can be granted for purely legal questions only. This
will require a workable definition of the purely legal category. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying
text (defining purely legal questions). Rule 56(c) must also be changed to the extent that citing to materials
from the record is used to demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact. The record's use must be
limited to support the movant's position on a purely legal question. Rule 50(a) likewise must represent the
judge's categorical limits. Rule 50(a)(1)'s language empowering the judge to grant judgment as a matter
of law when a reasonable jury would not have a sufficient basis to find for the party must be removed. As
at the summary judgment stage, this power applies only on purely legal questions. Finally, subsection (3)
would need to be removed from Rule 50(b) since the judge's only power is to order a new trial or allow the
jury verdict to stand. Additionally, language would need to be included that acknowledges that at the 50(b)
stage, judges have the power to order new trials on mixed questions only. See supra notes 157–61 and
accompanying text (defining mixed questions). Because a movant may not bring a Rule 50(b) motion
without first moving under Rule 50(a), the only instance where a judge could grant a new trial on a mixed
question at the Rule 50(b) stage would be where the movant moves for judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50(a), the judge recognizes a mixed question is raised, and submits the action the jury, reserving the
question for after the jury returns a verdict.
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that matter, what justifies borrowing modestly from the Court’s categoryplus-scrutiny approach used to assess restrictions of speech? The Seventh
Amendment is surely not animated by the same principles as the First. Other
proposals for constitutional borrowing involve amendments that are arguably
closely linked.209 Moreover, few would argue that the civil jury right is
among the “preferred rights” of our democracy like freedom of expression
is.210 Yet, more unconventional borrowing has been proposed as of late as
well.211 And, in general, borrowing from one constitutional area to help
address a question in another is an essential part of constitutional decision
making.212 But the main reason this approach is justified is that the Seventh
Amendment is fundamental. And restrictions that strike at the heart of a
fundamental right’s protection justify strict scrutiny.213
Fundamental rights are recognized by the Court for their role in
assuring a system of ordered liberty.214 Because of the role these rights play,
they restrain not just the federal government, but the states as well. Most of
the fundamental rights the Court has recognized were applied against the
states through the Due Process Clause.215 Other fundamental rights, like the
implied rights to travel, and to vote, were recognized under the equal
protection clause.216 Beginning in the 1960s, the Court began to fully
incorporate rights from the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights against
the states if they were fundamental from an American perspective.217
The Seventh Amendment has never been counted among this
group.218 It is true that the Court has recognized the importance of the Seventh
209
See Blocher, supra note 64, at 399–403 (addressing the textual and doctrinal links between the First
and Second Amendments in a proposal to apply the Court’s free speech balancing-categorical approach to
Second Amendment questions).
210
See, e.g., Robert B. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1184 (1959)
(“[F]reedom of expression is so vital in its relationship to the objectives of the Constitution that inevitably
it must stand in a preferred position.”).
211
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 22, at 895–96 (arguing for the use of the Court’s approach to the Seventh
Amendment to analyze Second Amendment questions).
212
Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 461–63 (2010).
213
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (applying strict scrutiny to New
Jersey’s public accommodations law that directly and immediately affect the freedom of association);
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25–28 (2010) (applying strict scrutiny to federal
“material-support” statute); Blocher, supra note 64, at 395 (strict scrutiny applies to restrictions of high
value speech); See supra note 20 (noting the central tenet of constitutional law that strict scrutiny applies
to fundamental rights).
214
See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (observing that fundamental rights are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty[] . . . .”).
215
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 1001 (2002)
(articulating how through the doctrine of substantive due process, both rights from the Bill and unenumerated rights deemed fundamental were applied against the states). But see Robert C. Farrell, An
Excess of Methods: Identifying Implied Fundamental Rights in the Supreme Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 203, 209 (2007) (arguing that implied fundamental rights are not recognized separately under the
due process and equal protection clauses but based on interchangeable and equivalent reasoning).
216
Dorf, supra note 215, at 962 n.35 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized two
fundamental rights for equal protection purposes: the right to vote and the right to travel).
217
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
218
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Amendment in other contexts, as a “fundamental guarantee of the rights and
liberties of the people[,]”219 and for which any encroachment on it “should be
scrutinized with the utmost care.”220
But in the fundamental rights context, renowned Justices have
belittled the Seventh Amendment compared with fundamental rights.221
Justice Felix Frankfurter, for instance, did not believe any amendments from
the Bill of Rights incorporated against the states.222 But he still singled out
the Seventh Amendment to illustrate the absurd results he thought “total
incorporation” of the Bill the Rights would reap.223 Justice Benjamin Cardozo
emphasized the importance of the freedom of assembly, and the free exercise
of religion by comparing them to the less important, civil jury right.224 Justice
Hugo Black was the leading proponent of total incorporation of the Bill of
Rights against the states, which of course would include the Seventh
Amendment.225 But he believed that potential supporters of total
incorporation would hesitate since it would mean the states would be bound
by the Seventh Amendment.226
Of course, most scholars do not rank the Seventh Amendment among
the fundamental either.227 Far from considering it central to our system of
ordered liberty, many scholars blame it for inefficiencies and incompetence
in the litigation system.228
But after the Court’s most recent elaboration in McDonald v.
Chicago, on what a right needs to be fundamental, all the academic doubts
219

Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830).
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
221
See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (to abolish the Seventh Amendment is not to violate a “principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”).
222
See Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Law: Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1220 (1995) (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s belief that the Bill
of Rights did not apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
223
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64–65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Even the
boldest innovator would shrink from suggesting to more than half the States that they may no longer initiate
prosecutions without indictment by grand jury, or that thereafter all the States of the Union must furnish a
jury of twelve for every case involving a claim above twenty dollars.”).
224
See Palko, 302 U.S. at 324–25 (comparing the jury right to more important rights like the freedom
of expression).
225
See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 70–72 (Black, J., dissenting) (articulating the theory of total incorporation
of the Bill of Rights against the states).
226
See HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 36 (1968) (observing that most people
“who object to complete incorporation of the Bill of Rights point to the Seventh Amendment” as
objectionable).
227
See, e.g., Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74,
76 (1963) (touting selective incorporation as a method for avoiding applying the Seventh Amendment to
the states); Gary S. Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 479, 502
(1973) (finding it unlikely that anyone would contend the Seventh Amendment is a fundamental right).
228
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 184–99 (1970) (attacking the convention
that lay jurors have unique fact-finding abilities since jurors are “notoriously gullible and
impressionable.”); Redish, supra note 170, at 488 (arguing that the “use of a jury in civil cases may present
serious problems—most notably, delay, jury prejudice, and questionable jury competence in more complex
cases.”).
220

Published by eCommons, 2015

368

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

about the Seventh Amendment’s importance are irrelevant. The McDonald
Court laid out step by step the factors to consider, and the kinds of sources the
Court would look to in order to gauge a right’s importance. Applying these
factors, the Court held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms was fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, and incorporated it
against the states.229
Applying these same factors, the Seventh Amendment passes as
well.230 For a right to be fundamental it must: 1) be a basic right that is
recognized historically and by many legal systems today; 2) be a fundamental
part of our nation’s founding; and 3) continue to be considered fundamental
at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.231
Despite the McDonald Court’s insistence that only the American
perspective counts in assessing a right’s importance, it looked to other
traditions when it considered the right to keep and bear arms.232 It supported
its conclusion that self-defense is a basic right with two different observations.
First, that it is an ancient right, recognized in the Jewish, Greek, and Roman
legal systems.233 And, second, it is recognized by many different systems in
the present day.234 The right to a civil jury trial’s historical pedigree is just as
strong. While its origins do not trace back as far as antiquity, it was in use in
one form or another in England for centuries, as discussed in Section II.A.
And, different legal systems protect a civil jury trial right today.235
To be a fundamental part of our nation’s founding, the Court
depended on a number of factors. These included: 1) its importance in the
English common law and the pre-ratification colonies; 2) its importance to
the ratification of the Constitution; and 3) how renowned commentators in the
colonial period viewed the right.236 To assess the first factor, the Court noted
the praise Blackstone heaped on the right to bear arms when he asserted it was
“one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen[] . . . .”237 But as noted in
Section II.A, Blackstone reserved grander praise for the right to a civil jury
trial, calling it “the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy”
and recognized it as a “principal bulwark” of liberty. The right to a civil jury
229

McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).
For another argument applying the McDonald factors and finding that the Seventh Amendment is
fundamental and incorporated against the states, see Thomas, supra note 18, at 184–85 (applying the
McDonald Court’s factors to the Seventh Amendment).
231
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–79 (establishing a three-factor test for a fundamental right).
232
Id. at 763–64 (discussing the effect on the Court’s approach to incorporation after the Court in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) held that whether a right is fundamental depends on
whether, it is necessary to “an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.”).
233
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 n.15 (citing the right to self-defense in the Jewish, Greek, and Roman
legal systems).
234
Id. at 767.
235
See NEIL VIDMAR, WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 421 (2000) (discussing the presence of civil jury systems
in foreign legal systems).
236
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–69 (2010).
237
Id. at 768 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008)).
230
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trial was widely supported among the colonists before ratification as well,
protected in one way or another in each of the thirteen original states formed
after the outbreak of hostilities with England.238
Inclusion of the jury trial right was also essential to the ratification
of the constitution. As the fear that the federal government would disarm the
people gripped the ratification debates,239 the lack of a guarantee of the civil
jury trial nearly derailed ratification.240 Antifederalists argued that ratification
of the original Constitution would abolish the civil jury trial.241 Thus, they
were just as vociferous in their support for its protection in the Constitution
as they were the right to keep and bear arms. In fact, the Seventh Amendment
as we know it was generated by the Antifederalists so that its inclusion was
the lynchpin to ratification.242 Moreover, despite arguments of the
Antifederalists to the contrary, Federalists revered the civil jury trial too. The
Federalist response to Antifederalists concern that the civil jury right would
be stripped by the new government was similar to its response to
Antifederalist concerns about the right to keep and bear arms. Federalists
argued that the constitution protected the civil jury right,243 not that “the right
was insufficiently important to warrant protection . . . .”244
Alexander Hamilton claimed to hold the civil jury right in equal
regard to the Antifederalists.245 It is true that Hamilton did not recognize a
causal link between the civil jury right and freedom, as the rhetoric of
Antifederalists suggested they did.246 But he still believed that a jury
assembled for just one case was less susceptible to government influence than
a single judge247 and considered it an “excellent method of determining
questions of property[] . . . .”248
238
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769 (noting state support for the right to keep and bear arms before
ratification); Wolfram, supra note 28, at 655 (assessing the protection of the civil jury right in the states
after the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain).
239
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 768 (discussing Antifederalist concerns that the new government would
disarm the people).
240
See, e.g., Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV.
289, 295 (1966) (observing that the failure to include a provision for the protection of civil juries was a
“prominent part of” opposition to ratification of the Constitution).
241
Wolfram, supra note 28, at 672 n.89.
242
See STORY & BIGELOW, supra note 29, at 544 (noting the Seventh Amendment weakened
opposition to the Constitution by taking away one of the strongest points of attack on it).
243
See Wolfram, supra note 28, at 670 n.85 (noting federalist arguments that the Constitution
safeguarded the civil jury trial right).
244
See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769 (discussing the federalist response that the constitution protected
the right to keep and bear arms).
245
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 33, at 379 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The friends and adversaries
of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the
trial by jury[] . . . .”).
246
Id. (observing that discussion of the link between the jury trial and freedom from oppression “would
be more curious than beneficial[] . . . .”); Wolfram, supra note 28, at 670 n.85 (discussing Antifederalist
Patrick Henry’s view of the threat to liberty by the loss of the civil jury trial, but suggesting that arguments
like these obscure the real substance of the arguments being made in favor of the civil jury trial).
247
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 33, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton).
248
Id.
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The states at large also supported the jury right as they did the right
to keep and bear arms.249 Near the time of ratification, “[e]leven of the
fourteen states protected the . . . jury trial right.”250 Moreover, some of the
same founding era legal commentators who strongly supported the right to
keep and bear arms, supported the jury right.251 For instance, as Justice Story
deemed the right to keep and bear arms “the palladium of the liberties of a
republic[,]”252 he held the jury trial in similar regard, calling it “a most
important and valuable amendment[] . . . .”253
Finally, the civil jury right was still considered fundamental when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The McDonald Court devoted much of
its analysis here to show that the protection of freed slaves, (the impetus
behind the Fourteenth Amendment) was furthered by the right to keep and
bear arms.254 It must be conceded that the protection of the civil jury right
was not the difference between life and death for freedmen enduring Southern
terror as the McDonald Court portrayed the protection of the right to keep and
bear arms to be.
But its importance to freedmen, albeit indirect, was critical
nonetheless. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to protect
people freed from slavery. This included the protection of their property,
which required the civil jury trial right.255 Without the ability to bring a suit
with a jury trial right for violation of their property rights, property rights for
freed people could be “illusory.”256 The jury trial may also be the preferred
method to enforce other fundamental rights because of the jury’s stronger
insulation from government influence than judges.257 More direct evidence
of the jury trial right’s fundamental status is demonstrated by its protection in
the states at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. While the
right to keep and bear arms was protected in twenty-two of the thirty-seven
state constitutions,258 the civil jury right was even more widely protected. The
constitutions of thirty-six of thirty-seven states guaranteed civil juries.259
249
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (discussing the thirteen states that had constitutional provisions
protecting the right to keep and bear arms around the time of ratification).
250
Thomas, supra note 18, at 192 (canvassing states around the time of ratification that protected the
jury right).
251
See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769 (discussing founding era legal scholars’ support for the right to keep
and bear arms).
252
Id. at 770 (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1890 (1833)).
253
STORY & BIGELOW, supra note 29, at 544.
254
See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 773–74 (discussing how the right to keep and bear arms protected freed
slaves from southern violence).
255
Thomas, supra note 18, at 193.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 193–94; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
258
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 777.
259
See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the
Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in American History and
Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 77 (2008) (discussing civil jury provisions in state constitutions).
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Thus, because the civil jury right is a basic right, fundamental to our nation’s
founding and when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it is a
fundamental right. But as noted in the Introduction, fundamental rights do
not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny. What other reasons support its use
then?
B. Strict Scrutiny Satisfies the Substance of Common Law Better than
Formalism
One might also contend that strict scrutiny is not as protective of the
right as this Article argues. It is still a balancing test, and as noted in Section
III.D, balancing is alleged to be incapable of protecting even fundamental
rights. The Court has echoed this sentiment in its recent decisions barring
balancing for the Second Amendment.260 Moreover, Seventh Amendment
commentators have long believed that the Court’s formalist analogical
reasoning is more protective than a balancing test would be.261
But how could the protection resulting from the Court’s formalist
reasoning used to assess judicial procedures be stronger than strict scrutiny?
The category-plus-scrutiny approach borrowed from free speech almost never
upholds restrictions of core speech.262 But the Court’s formalist assessment
is wrong, time and again, by upholding judicial procedures that undermine
the civil jury trial. As discussed in Section II.B, under this approach the Court
mechanically analogizes to the common law to see whether the motion is
similar to judicial procedures at common law. In so doing, the Court has
upheld every single motion that has taken cases out of the jury’s hands.263
And for the motions at issue here in particular, there is strong
evidence they do not satisfy the substance of common law at all. Each of the
Court’s twentieth-century decisions upholding summary judgment, directed
verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, are deeply flawed.264 As
discussed in Section III.B, at common law, summary judgment did not exist.
A judge would not consider whether all the evidence was sufficient to support
a jury verdict until after a jury rendered a verdict. Nor could judges apply the
reasonable jury test to take questions of fact from the jury. And, where
questions were withdrawn from the jury, they were really questions of law.
Judges could also not determine who won, if the judge thought the evidence
was against the jury’s verdict. Instead, a new trial would be ordered with a

260

See infra Part VI.A.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
262
See Weinstein, supra note 74, at 492 (restrictions of highly protected speech are subject to strict
scrutiny, but most speech does not fall within this category). But see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 25–28, 39 (2010) (uncommon instance where a content-based restriction of political speech
was upheld).
263
See supra note 81.
264
See supra note 81 and accompanying text (listing each decision).
261
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whole new jury.
As discussed in Section III.B, judgment as a matter of law motions
do not have sound basis in the common law either. The Court deemed the
directed verdict constitutional even though the procedure it analogized to at
common law, the demurrer to the evidence,265 only took truly legal questions
from the jury. The procedure was not used to take pure questions of fact away
from the jury. Likewise, the Court deemed judgment notwithstanding the
verdict constitutional266 even though when jury verdicts were subject to later
decisions by common law courts on questions of law, the reserved questions
really were questions of law as well. So that now, judges decide fact questions
on judgment notwithstanding the verdict that juries would have at common
law.267 This willingness to ignore or misinterpret the common law is not
simply a twentieth-century problem, either. For instance, throughout the
nineteenth century, the Court approved expanding the use of directed verdict
without ever considering the constitutional basis of the procedure in any
depth.268
All this points to one of two conclusions: 1) the Justices have proven
incapable of correctly analogizing to the common law;269 or 2) formalist
reasoning is the wrong doctrine to satisfy the substance of the common law.
Either way, however paradoxical it may seem, the strict scrutiny advocated
here to limit the judge’s ability to grant summary judgment and judgment as
a matter of law would actually satisfy the substance of common law better
than the procedures formalism sanctioned.
That is because, as discussed in more detail in Section IV.D, a judge
may grant summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law only on purely
legal questions. A judge will not have the power to grant judgment on pure
fact and mixed questions by applying the reasonable jury test. Second, under
strict scrutiny, it is true that judges can overturn jury verdicts through a Rule
50 motion on mixed questions. This means that judges can still potentially
weigh the facts involved. But as at common law, the most the judge can do
is order a new trial if the judge believes the jury’s verdict is against the
evidence.
265
See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943) (discussing the directed verdict’s similarity
to the demurrer to the evidence); Sward, supra note 10, at 599 (discussing the Galloway Court’s
comparison of the demurrer to the evidence to the directed verdict).
266
See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659 (1935) (upholding the
constitutionality of judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
267
Sward, supra note 10, at 624.
268
Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury
Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 866 (2014).
269
Justice Brennan recognized the Court’s shortcomings in analogical reasoning in determining
whether the jury right is triggered. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 575–77 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the difficulty the Court has in comparing “the
substantive right at issue to forms of action used in English courts 200 years ago” in deciding whether the
jury right applies).
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C. Other Balancing Could Prove Fatal
Another argument for strict scrutiny is that it is a much better
alternative than the kind of balancing that could be deployed in Seventh
Amendment cases. The Mathews balancing test could be that test. It weighs:
1) the importance of the interest at stake; 2) the risk of a mistaken deprivation
of the interest because of the procedures used; 3) the probable value of added
safeguards; and 4) the government's interest.270 But the test’s use in civil cases
involving private litigants271 demonstrates that it could be used to assess
whether the Seventh Amendment deprives litigants’ procedural due process
rights. Indeed, some courts have done just that. For instance, in In re
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation the court held that denial
of the jury right might be necessary to minimize the risk of erroneous
decisions in complex cases.272 The court recognized that the historical test
required the jury for the claims involved.273 But the court still held that the
competing due process interests resolved the balance against the Seventh
Amendment.
It is true this was a rare, brazen departure from the historical test. The
Supreme Court never adopted this approach.274 But commentators have also
argued for the consideration of modern social goals like efficiency to limit the
jury trial right.275 Views like these, and like that of the court in In re Japanese
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation demonstrate how the wrong kind of
balancing could emasculate the Seventh Amendment.
Indeed, one
commentator applauded the heightened pleading standard fashioned by the
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, as a logical extension of the Mathews
balancing test.276 But however strong a litigant’s interest in avoiding
discovery, there are compelling arguments that the Twombly standard violates
the Seventh Amendment too.277
270
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (delineating three-part test to assess whether
procedural due process rights were violated).
271
Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to
Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010) (discussing how the Court in Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1
(1991) applied the Mathews test to two private litigants).
272
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980); Joseph P.
Musacchio, Federal Courts––A Due Process Limitation on the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in
Complex Civil Litigation—In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir.
1980), 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 547, 549–50 (1981) (noting how the court articulated a complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment to protect due process values such as promoting rational decisionmaking).
273
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1079 (acknowledging the claims in the case
for treble damages under antitrust and antidumping laws to be legal in nature).
274
See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s current formalist approach
to the Seventh Amendment).
275
See Redish, supra note 170, at 489 (advocating a strict historical test since the jury trial is inefficient
and limiting it, would promote “modern social goals”).
276
See Blair-Stanek, supra note 271, at 17 (arguing the Twombly Court recognized that misused
discovery can deprive litigants of property and liberty interests under the Mathews’ test).
277
See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851,
1867–71 (2008) (analyzing the constitutional concerns caused by Twombly).
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Of course, there is nothing to suggest that the Court is willing to recast
the Seventh Amendment in terms of the due process rights of the litigants.
But, it is possible. So, if the balancing void is to be filled, it should be with
strict scrutiny, a test that protects the Seventh Amendment right. And here,
strict scrutiny does not just result in automatic protection of the right as some
argue strict scrutiny does in other contexts.278 The non-movant’s Seventh
Amendment interest is not categorically protected when motions for summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law are raised. Through strict scrutiny,
the non-movant’s interest in a civil jury trial actually can be restricted. Thus,
there really is a method of analysis that involves both assessing the category
at stake and what means are appropriate given the category.
The Seventh Amendment’s fundamental status, the failures of
formalism, and the poor alternative balancing tests should convince the Court
of the wisdom of strict scrutiny. Of course, it is no accident that the Court’s
approach to the Seventh Amendment is its most formalist and that the Court
has eschewed balancing. Are there strong reasons why balancing cannot be
used? Is the Seventh Amendment encoded with an aversion to balancing?
VI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST STRICT SCRUTINY
This Section addresses potential arguments against balancing for the
Seventh Amendment and whether there is another explanation for why the
Court does not ordinarily balance for Seventh Amendment cases.
A. The Second Amendment’s Inoculation
A strong argument against balancing is based on the right the Court
most recently designated fundamental, the right to keep and bear arms.279
While declaring the right fundamental, the Court has rejected balancing of
any kind to assess restrictions of the right.280 Since this Article argues that the
Seventh Amendment is fundamental, perhaps the Court has embarked on a
new experiment where fundamental rights must preclude balancing of any
kind. One might argue that important rights do not need balancing: the Court
has demonstrated that categorical approaches will do. But despite the Court’s
proscription, circuit courts generated a mishmash of balancing approaches to
assess state gun restrictions.281 Leading commentators chalk this up to the
incompatibility of the Court’s test to assess restrictions of the Second
Amendment. While on the one hand forbidding balancing in favor of an
historical assessment, the Court accepted some existing gun regulations that
278
See Sullivan, supra note 69, at 605–07 (arguing strict scrutiny results in categorical protection of
the right at stake).
279
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
280
Miller, supra note 22, at 868 n.67 (discussing the Court’s rejection of balancing for the Second
Amendment).
281
Id. at 866–71 (cataloguing the balancing tests produced by the circuit courts including, most
frequently intermediate scrutiny, and a “mixed category-plus-scrutiny approach.”).
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did not exist when the Second Amendment was passed.282 As a result, lower
courts naturally drifted towards interest-based justifications for gun
regulations.
But those courts did not have to balance. Other courts took purely
categorical approaches to whether a gun restriction violated the Second
Amendment.283 Thus, balancing cannot be explained simply by the
incompatible features of the test. Another commentator’s assessment cuts
directly to the heart of the matter: even though the Court forbade balancing,
it “is inevitable as courts grapple with the scope of the right[] . . . .”284 The
common thread of all fundamental rights, including the right to keep and bear
arms, is that courts grapple with the right’s scope. And adjustments to the
scope of the right are made through balancing. It is only a matter of time
before the Court itself yields to the same pressure to weigh the interests at
stake.285 So the Court has not developed a new insight into the nature of
important rights and balancing. Balancing is still used for important rights
and can be for the Seventh Amendment, which as discussed, is fundamental.
B. The Government vs. Individual Paradigm is Missing from Seventh
Amendment Cases
Another argument against balancing is that restrictions of the Seventh
Amendment do not present the classic “government vs. individual” case. The
Court’s power of judicial review is used to assess acts of the political
branches.286 As a corollary, balancing tests often assess the government’s
interest in regulating a right vs. the individual’s interest in exercising it.287

282
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v. Heller:
Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a
Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1482 (2009) (describing the difficulty of applying the Heller
Court’s test); Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 731 (2012) (“Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller characterized
disarming felons as a longstanding tradition, federal law did not disqualify any felons from possessing
firearms until 1938 and did not disqualify nonviolent felons until 1961.”); Miller, supra note 22, at 866
(describing the difficulty of applying a “test that can simultaneously remain faithful to history, keep judges
from balancing, and justify the existing set of presumptively lawful regulations.”).
283
See Miller, supra note 22, at 867 (discussing the categorical approach taken by the court in Nordyke
v. King 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009)).
284
Blocher, supra note 64, at 407 n.142.
285
Other courts have used balancing in the midst of transformative Second Amendment decisions. See
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (breaking with federal court precedent and
construing the Second Amendment to protect an individual right to bear arms). With a newly christened
individual right at stake, the Emerson court suggested it would use something like strict scrutiny to assess
future gun restrictions. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683,
690 (2007) (discussing the Emerson Court’s use of strict scrutiny rhetoric). And, of course fierce
opposition to balancing in one case does not signal opposition to balancing in another. For instance, Justice
Thomas joined the Heller majority’s proscription against balancing, but has advocated balancing
elsewhere. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(advocating application of strict scrutiny to regulations of campaign contributions).
286
E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803).
287
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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But many of the restrictions of the Seventh Amendment are judge-made.288
For instance, a judge decides whether to take a case out of the jury’s hands if
a reasonable jury could not find for the non-movant.289 The issue then is not
whether legislation infringed on the jury right, but whether the judge did. So
by this logic, the reasonable jury standard, as with other Seventh Amendment
restrictions, is a judicial device for which balancing is not appropriate.
This argument fails because there are plenty of balancing tests the
Court applies to judicial action, not policies from the political branches. For
instance, the procedural fairness prong of the personal jurisdiction test is just
that kind of balancing test.290 In the fundamental rights context, the Court has
balanced to review judicial decisions on granting continuances, whether to
allow hearsay or require that a criminal trial be open to the public, among
other judicial action.291
As a constitutional matter, accepting the notion that judicial action is
not really government action would permit courts to impact legal rights and
hide behind the fact that it does not emanate from the political branches.292
These arguments also ignore the fact that there are restrictions of the Seventh
Amendment via the policy-making branches. While Congress has never
admitted its intention to constrain the jury,293 it has enacted statutes that have
had just that effect.294
Finally, since the jury is a distinct entity within the judiciary, the
Seventh Amendment arguably sets the stage for a kind of intra-branch
balancing assessment between judge and jury, rather than an individual vs.
government model. Suja Thomas has taken this view one step further,
advocating that the jury be viewed as a separate branch all together.295 So for
the Seventh Amendment, that would mean that if there was to be any
balancing, it would not be between the individual litigant and the state, but
some construction of the jury itself and the judge. Indeed, as discussed above,
288
See, e.g., Sward, supra note 10, at 575 (noting how a series of Supreme Court decisions reoriented
power away from civil juries in favor of judges).
289
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
290
E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978).
291
E.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); see supra note 179 and
accompanying text.
292
See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (acts that impact legal rights must fulfill
requirements of bicameralism and presentment).
293
See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 539 (4th ed. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has not yet been faced with the situation in which Congress has expressed a strong preference for
nonjury trial and has provided reasons supporting that preference. Read more narrowly, then, the cases do
not foreclose the possibility that Congress can provide for a statutory cause of action that is not purely
equitable to be enforced in the district courts without a jury trial.”).
294
See Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in NonArticle
III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 417
(1995) (noting instances where congress assigned questions away from jury to non-article III proceedings).
295
Thomas, supra note 86, at 513–15; Suja A. Thomas, The Other Branch: Restoring the Jury’s Role
in the American Constitution (forthcoming).
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the Framers believed participation on juries would foster democratic
participation. So members of a jury who would otherwise hear a case are
denied the chance for civic engagement when no jury is impaneled. Thus, the
jury’s interest in democratic participation could be weighed against the
judge’s interest in determining whether trial is necessary.296 But this “jury vs.
judge” mode of analysis should not prevent balancing either. In other
contexts, the Court has balanced the interests between different branches as
well.297 Either way you slice it, there is nothing unique about the restrictions
of the Seventh Amendment, or the judge-jury arrangement, which precludes
balancing.
C. The Seventh Amendment’s Text is “Balancing-Averse”
Another argument against strict scrutiny is that the Seventh
Amendment’s text is averse to balancing. In this vein, some commentators
argue that amendments with narrow, and unequivocal text are averse to
balancing, while ambiguous and less absolute text predisposes the right to
balancing.298 This breakdown does not always lead commentators to
consistently categorize a right as belonging to one group or the other.299 And
some even dispute the idea that one kind of right could be more predisposed
to balancing than another.300 Nonetheless, commentators often characterize
the same rights as either “prone” or “averse” to balancing.301
Examples of balancing-prone text include the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement, the Speedy Trial Clause, and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.302 What links these together are the ambiguous
adjectives that act as constraints on the government.303 A search and seizure
must be “reasonable,” a criminal trial must be “speedy,” and punishment may
not be “cruel and unusual.”304 But it is not clear from the text what is
296

See supra Part IV.B (discussing government interests in summary judgment).
See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of General Servs., 433 U.S 425, 443 (1977) (balancing between the
President and Congress).
298
See, e.g., Elson, supra note 171, at 167–69 (assessing the predisposition to balancing of each right
on a continuum, ranging from the most prone to balancing (vague and general rights) to the least (rights
narrowly defined or linked to specific historical circumstances)); William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review
of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 116 (1982) (discussing how absolute text renders
balancing of the interests “irrelevant”).
299
Elson, supra note 171, at 168 (“The vagueness, even more than the generality, of the first
amendment's prohibition against abridging freedom of speech has required interest balancing . . . .”);
Blocher, supra note 64, at 401 (the “exceptionally crisp and unambiguous[]” language of the First
Amendment predisposes it to rule-based reasoning rather than balancing) (quoting Van Alstyne, supra note
298, at 110).
300
See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 44, at 995–96 (arguing against the notion that certain text is more
predisposed to balancing than other text).
301
See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 298, at 116 (describing the First Amendment as averse to
balancing); Blocher, supra note 64, at 401; Elson, supra note 171, at 168 (describing the reasonableness
requirement in the search and seizure clause as prone to balancing); Fisher, supra note 175, at 1523.
302
E.g., Fischer, supra note 175, at 1523; Blocher, supra note 64, at 401 n.114.
303
Van Alstyne, supra note 298, at 111; Fisher, supra note 175, at 1523.
304
U.S. CONST. amends. IV, VI, VIII.
297
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reasonable, speedy, or cruel and unusual.305 Because these adjectives are not
self-defined,306 courts naturally balance the interests at stake to help fill in the
gaps.
Examples of balancing-averse text, on the other hand, include the
Free Speech Clause: Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.”307 Unlike searches and seizures, which may reasonably be carried
out by the state, the freedom from government restrictions on speech is
absolute.308 No kind of abridgement is permitted, even if it is reasonable.309
Rights like the right to keep and bear arms and to confront adverse witnesses
are similarly unequivocal and narrow. The text protects a precise activity,
rather than enshrining a general principle.310
The Seventh Amendment belongs to this group as well. While the
terms “preserved” and “common law” may seem ambiguous, they are not
susceptible to cost-benefit analysis or spectrums like the adjectives
“reasonable” and “speedy” are. The text guarantees only that a particular
mechanism, the jury, be preserved so there is no need for balancing to help
fill in the gaps.311 The civil jury right, being narrowly defined, applies in
federal court only if the suit was recognized at common law.312
But we know that the Court still applies balancing tests to rights with
absolute and narrowly defined text. The First Amendment contains absolutist
language, yet balancing has continued in free speech cases for seventy-five
years.313 Balancing has also abounded in cases interpreting narrowly defined
rights to a criminal trial, compulsory process, and confrontation.314 While
there is no evidence to suggest that the framers anticipated balancing to assess
305
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 175, at 1523 (deciding whether a search or seizure is “unreasonable” is
a matter of gradation).
306
See Blocher, supra note 64, at 401 n.114 (arguing adjectives in the constitution that are not “selfdefining” lead to balancing) (quoting Van Alstyne, supra note 298, at 110). But see Laurent B. Frantz, Is
the First Amendment Law?––A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 732–34 (1963)
(arguing that the lack of self-defining phrases in the Constitution does not necessitate balancing).
307
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
308
Van Alstyne, supra note 298, at 110–11.
309
Id.
310
See Blocher, supra note 64, at 401 (arguing the Second Amendment “at least arguably has language
that is as precise and absolutist as the First.”); Fisher, supra note 175, at 1523–24 (arguing balancing is not
necessary since the text guarantees confrontation as the precise method to ensure reliability of testimony).
311
See Fisher, supra note 175, at 1523 (arguing that when interpreting a noun in the Constitution, like
the right to a “jury,” categorical rules are necessary unlike when applying an adjective which requires
balancing); see also supra note 158 (arguing the Seventh Amendment preservation command “drives”
analogical reasoning not balancing). But see Elson, supra note 171, at 169 (arguing the seventh amendment
falls somewhere in the middle between narrowly defined text and text conveying broad principles).
312
See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
313
See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1425 (1962) (noting
how balancing free speech first occurred in Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
314
John Stocker, Sixth Amendment -- Preclusion of Defense Witnesses and the Sixth Amendment's
Compulsory Process Clause Right to Present a Defense, Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988), 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 835, 854–55 (1988) (teasing out the factors to consider in the balancing test to
determine whether compulsory process is infringed articulated in Taylor v. Illinois); see supra note 293
and accompanying text.
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the Seventh Amendment,315 the same can be said for all of the other
amendments that are balanced, even the open-ended reasonableness test.316
Still, the greatest challenge to balancing for Seventh Amendment
cases is that the text uniquely requires that the right to a jury be “preserved.”
As noted in Section III.D, this suggests that balancing is precluded because
the text requires the jury trial as it existed at common law no matter the
interests at stake. But there are two reasons why this argument fails. First,
no one takes the preservation command literally; few would argue that the
Seventh Amendment requires an exact replica of the right to the jury trial as
it existed at common law.317 The Court has agreed with this sentiment, so that
more causes of action require the civil jury trial than a strict historical
approach would require318 and judicial procedures do not need to mimic every
detail of the procedures at common law.319 Thus, if the “preserved” language
leaves room for these changes, there is no reason why it cannot also allow
room for balancing.
Second, as noted in Section II.B, the Court has arguably balanced
before. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Court determined that
a question of patent claim construction should be decided by the judge rather
than the jury, in part, because, “judges, not juries, are the better suited to find
the acquired meaning of patent terms.”320 And, previously, the Court signaled
that balancing is acceptable in Ross v. Bernhard, when it observed in a
footnote that the jury right’s applicability may depend in part, on “the
practical abilities and limitations of juries[] . . . .”321 While the Court later
disavowed the Ross footnote,322 the “preserved” language did stop the Court
in its tracks and force a wholesale ban on balancing for fear of trampling on
the text. Any argument that strict scrutiny cannot be used because of the
preservation requirement is belied by the Court's prior forays into other kinds
of balancing.
315

Redish & La Fave, supra note 294, at 411.
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
197, 237 n.140 (1993) (arguing that the Framers did not intend the Fourth Amendment to necessitate
balancing).
317
See, e.g., Redish, supra note 170, at 511 (discussing that there is no evidence that the Framers
intended the term “preserve” to result in “a photographic reproduction of the jury trial right as of 1791 . . .
.”).
318
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
319
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
320
Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996); see also Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to
a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1138–39
(2003) (noting that the Markman Court applied functional considerations); Miller, supra note 22, at 886
(noting that Markman may be a rare example of open Seventh Amendment balancing).
321
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970); Miller, supra note 22, at 886 (noting that the
Ross footnote was a rare instance of explicit balancing). But see Redish, supra note 170, at 524 (observing
that the Ross footnote “may have indirectly adopted a balancing test[]” but ultimately finding that it did
not).
322
See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987) (observing that the Court has not
considered the practical limitations of juries “as an independent basis for extending the right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment.”).
316
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D. The Lack of Balancing at Common Law Precludes Balancing Now
Closely related to the text-based argument, it could be said that
because the Court takes a unique formalist approach through engagement with
the common law, balancing cannot be used to determine if the jury right
applies. After all, most commentators mark the beginning of balancing to the
1930s.323 No court used strict scrutiny at common law England in 1791.324
But the test for whether judicial procedures are constitutional is that they
satisfy the substance of the common law, that is, that juries decide questions
of fact, and judges decide questions of law. The test is not that formalist
reasoning must be used. Formalist reasoning happens to be the means used
by the Court to reach that end. As discussed in detail in Section V.B, formalist
reasoning has led to the conclusion that these motions satisfy the substance of
the common law even though they do not. But, strict scrutiny, as applied here,
limits the judge’s ability to take cases from the jury in a way that more closely
resembles the common law. So while strict scrutiny may not have been used
at common law, its application here embodies the judge-jury arrangement at
common law better than formalist reasoning did.325
Moreover, despite the Seventh Amendment’s preservation
requirement, both the historical test and the “substance” of the common law
constraint are still judge-made doctrines326 and the staying power of these
approaches does not mean the Court cannot change in favor of balancing. The
Court may determine that the preservation of the right as it existed at common
law is better served by balancing. After all, the Court’s free speech
jurisprudence was originally governed by formal or categorical reasoning, as
was the Court’s approach to the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, but balancing
eventually swept across all three of these areas.327 At the same time, the use
of balancing in some contexts does not require the end of the “substance” at
the common law requirement. There are plenty of instances where the Court
blends adjudicative approaches like balancing and formal or categorical
reasoning in the same case.328 In fact, that is what is advocated here, by
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requiring the least restrictive means for mixed questions that would have been
decided by the jury at common law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law have singularly
undermined the civil jury right. The Court’s formalism has failed to address
the impact these procedures have had on the Seventh Amendment. Indeed, it
was the Court’s formalist reasoning that upheld summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law, even though they did not exist at common law.
Formalist reasoning also strengthened these motions through the Summary
Judgment Trilogy. This is unjustified. The Seventh Amendment is a
fundamental right and should not have to languish in only one adjudicative
approach. Balancing is no cure-all and is even responsible for the
undermining of some rights. But strict scrutiny, the most protective of
balancing tests, is justified as an alternative to formalism because of the
Seventh Amendment’s importance, the way these judicial procedures have
undermined the jury right, and the way judges have co-opted questions that
were once for the jury.
Through a blended category-plus-scrutiny approach, certain
questions will be assigned value based on their importance to the Seventh
Amendment. Instead of permitting judges to grant summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law without any recognition of the non-movant’s right
interest, now the means available to the judge will depend on the category of
the question raised in the motion. This is similar to the Court’s approach to
free speech: the level of scrutiny increases with the importance of the category
of speech restricted and rarely upholds restrictions of speech with high First
Amendment value. Rather than continuing to criticize the Court on the
Court’s terms, it makes sense to invite the Court to view the Seventh
Amendment in a different way. That is, by recognizing the interests at stake.
By offering an alternative view of the Seventh Amendment, summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law can finally be restrained. With
that, a right the founders revered can be revived.
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